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INTRODUCTION
1See infra Part I.B.
2See Mark D. Rosen, Should Un-American Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. xx (forthcoming
Spring 2004) [hereinafter “Un-American Judgments”].
If a foreign government enacts a law that would be unconstitutional
if passed in the United States, can a foreign judgment based on that law be
enforced in an American court?  For example, can an American  court enforce
an English  judgment based on English defamation law, which is more pro-
plaintiff than the First Amendment permits American law to be?  American
courts to date uniformly have said “no,” concluding that to enforce such a
foreign judgment itself would be unconstitutional.1  This Article argues that
these courts’ analysis is mistaken:  While such foreign judgments may well be
“Un-American” insofar as they come from non-American polities and reflect
political values that are at variance with American constitutional law, neither
the foreign judgments themselves nor their enforcement by an American court
is unconstitutional.  Categorically refusing to enforce such Un-American
Judgments is tantamount to imposing U.S. constitutional norms on foreign
countries.
Much is at stake, for enforcement questions frequently arise and, when
they do, they implicate a wide range of parties and interests.    In today’s global
economy, plaintiffs often prevail only to find post-judgment that the
defendant or its assets are outside the jurisdiction of the ruling court.  Without
voluntary compliance or adequate pre-judgment attachment – both of which
frequently are absent –  the plaintiff can recover only if she can enforce the
judgment in the court of a country where the losing party or its assets can be
found.  In addition to the plaintiff’s obvious interests in enforcing the
judgments, the country whose court issued the judgment also typically desires
enforcement.  Laws typically advance social policies, and not enforcing the
foreign judgment can impede the country that  issued the judgment from
advancing its chosen social policy.   The issuing  country might retaliate if its
judgements are not enforced, refusing to enforce judgments from the other
jurisdiction in the future.   The legal uncertainties attending enforcement
disputes can impose economic burdens, encumber international business, and
foul diplomatic relations.
The American courts’ mistaken constitutional analysis has begotten
pernicious consequences.  It has hidden the hard policy choices that  must be
made in determining whether to enforce foreign judgments, obscuring the fact
that the more political branches of government are best institutionally suited
to making such value-laden judgments.2  The erroneous constitutional analysis
narrows the scope of the President’s power to pursue an executive agreement
or to negotiate an enforcement treaty with other countries, thereby depriving
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3While the Constitution explicitly grants to the Senate alone the power of providing advice and consent
in respect of treaties, see U.S. CONST. Art. II, §2, cl. 2,  the Congress in practice often plays a far greater
role in foreign affairs than this might suggest.  Of particular relevance here, many international matters
that likely would fit within the treaty power, such as NAFTA, recently have been understood as requiring
approval by both houses of Congress.  See generally Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional? 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995).  Conversely, it also is well established that the President may
enter into so-called “executive agreements” with foreign countries, which require approval from neither
house of Congress.  See generally American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386-87
(2003).
4It is well-established that “no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on
any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.”  Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890) (similar).
5See Rosen, Un-American Judgments, supra note 2, at xx.
6See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
F o r e i g n  J u d g e m e n t s  i n  C i v i l  a n d  C o m m e r c i a l  M a t t e r s ,
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html.
7334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
the President and Congress of powers in respect of foreign affairs3 that are
constitutionally theirs to exercise.4  Moreover, the courts’ faulty analysis has
resulted in outcomes that are unfair from virtually any normative perspective.5
This is a particularly opportune time to correct the constitutional
misperceptions concerning Un-American Judgments.  Under the auspices of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the United States is in the
process of negotiating an international treaty dealing with the enforcement of
foreign judgments.6  Particularly because the issues implicated by whether
foreign judgments are enforced are wide-ranging and significant, it is
important that American negotiators not be constrained by illusions of
constitutional limitations when they attend to their task of forging a
multilateral treaty.
The Article is in five parts.  Part I explains the weighty considerations
that are implicated by the question of whether foreign judgments are to be
enforced and shows that American courts almost always enforce run-of-the-
mill foreign judgments under a comity analysis.  Part II demonstrates that
courts have used a different approach – a constitutional analysis –  when
confronting foreign judgments based on laws that American polities cannot
constitutionally enact.  These courts uniformly have concluded that they were
constitutionally barred from enforcing such foreign judgments on account of
the rule famously announced in Shelley v. Kraemer.7
Parts III and IV explain why, contrary to these courts’ conclusions, the
Constitution does not prevent the enforcement of Un-American Judgments.
Part III argues that the American courts’ approach is anomalous under
contemporary state action doctrine.  Although judicial enforcement surely
constitutes state action, consistency as between domestic and foreign
judgments requires that the substance of the foreign law not be attributed to
the state.  Shelley notwithstanding, American courts today routinely enforce
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8See Molly S. Van Houweling, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, the First Amendment, and Internet Speech: Notes
for the Next Yahoo! v. LICRA, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697, 703-04, 713-16 (2003).
restrictions on speech that arise from domestic contracts that could not have
been enacted into law due to the First Amendment.  Judicial enforcement of
such private agreements regularly is held to not trigger First Amendment
scrutiny.  The Article argues that this robust line of case law is normatively
desirable, and then explains why foreign judgments premised on foreign
countries’ laws are not meaningfully different from domestic claims based on
private contract for purposes of the state action doctrine.  Accordingly,  if the
state action doctrine does not prevent American courts from enforcing
contractual limitations that could not have been enacted into general law – and
it does not – the doctrine also should not preclude the enforcement of Un-
American Judgments. 
Having disposed of the analysis that has been relied upon by American
courts to date, the Article in Part IV considers an intriguing argument recently
advanced in the scholarly literature that would appear to circumvent the state
action problem identified in Part III.8   It has been proposed that a legal
requirement that foreign judgments be enforced constitutes a “generally-
applicable” legal rule that triggers First Amendment scrutiny if and when its
application imposes significant effects on speech.  Part IV shows that such an
approach is not consistent with contemporary law concerning incidental
burdens on fundamental rights.  Nor would such an approach be normatively
desirable, Part IV contends, for it reproduces the  difficulties that plague the
recent courts’ troubled state action analysis.
After showing in Parts III and IV that the Constitution does not
answer the question whether American courts should enforce Un-American
Judgments, Part V considers several costs of the  over-constitutionalization
that the Article has diagnosed. First, the illusion of unconstitutionality has
hidden the fact that whether Un-American Judgments are to be enforced is
not predetermined by the Constitution, but instead must be decided on the
basis of policy.  Second, as an institutional matter, the belief that enforcement
implicated the Constitution meant, in practice, that enforcement
determinations fell exclusively within the judiciary’s purview.  Dispelling the
specter of unconstitutionality enables one to see that the executive and
legislative branches properly play an important, if not the dominant, role in
formulating our country’s policy with regard to the enforcement of Un-
American Judgments.  Third, eliminating the misconception of
unconstitutionality illuminates the fact that the courts to date have utilized a
wholly American-centered analysis that categorically disregards a range of
considerations that, on virtually any normative theory, are relevant to deciding
whether Un-American Judgments should be enforced.  A short conclusion
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9See infra Part I.
10See generally  EUGENE SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1194-99 (3rd ed. 2000). 
11159 U.S. 113 (1895).  The Hilton Court articulated a comity doctrine under which foreign judgments
generally would be enforced, id. at 163-65, though it did not enforce the judgment before it on the ground
that France would not have enforced the United States judgment.
12REST. (2D) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §117 comment c; see also id.at  § 98 (“A valid judgment rendered
in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States so
far as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned.”).  No reported cases have
rejected the Restatement’s approach to the enforcement of foreign judgments.  
13See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998).  The first court's judgment must be
enforced even if its based on a law that is antithetical to the second state's public policy.  See id. at 233.
14See REST. (2D) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 92.
15Id., §117, comment c.
16This stands in dramatic contrast to the law that is applicable in the purely domestic context, for the
Supreme Court has ruled that there is no  public policy exception that permits a court to refuse to enforce
the judgment of a sister state.  See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233(1998) (“our
decisions support no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments”).
follows.
I.     THE ENFORCEMENT OF SIMPLE FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
As mentioned above, whether foreign judgments are enforced affects
not only the parties to the foreign lawsuit, but also the sovereign interests of
the country that has issued the judgment, the interests of the country that is
being asked to enforce the judgment, and the stability of the international
business and legal system.9  Due undoubtedly to this array of interests, a
system of cooperation among countries has emerged with regard to the
enforcement of foreign judgments.10  Indeed, the United States has been at the
vanguard of enforcing foreign judgments, beginning with the late nineteenth
century Supreme Court decision of Hilton v. Guyot.11  Since then, courts in this
country have analyzed enforcement questions under the doctrine of comity
and almost always have enforced foreign judgments.  
Accurately describing the case law, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws states that a “judgment rendered in a foreign nation . . . will,
if valid, usually be given the same effect as a sister State judgment.”12  Because
the Constitution almost categorically requires one State to enforce sister State
judgments,13 the Restatement rule means that “valid” foreign judgments will
be enforced by American courts.  Foreign judgments are deemed to be “valid”
if the foreign court properly asserted personal jurisdiction and if the foreign
tribunal utilizes procedures that are not fundamentally unfair.14  If these
conditions are met, the Restatement instructs, the foreign judgment should be
enforced unless “the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of
what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.”15 This last
caveat is what typically is spoken of as the public policy exception.16  Statutes
and treaties that address the enforcement of specific types of judgments or
their analogues – such as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
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17See, e.g.,  13 U.L.A. 419 (1980) (Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act:  a foreign money judgment
“is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister-state which is entitled to full faith and
credit,” subject only to the caveats listed in §4); Antco Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Sidermar S.p.A., 417 F. Supp.
207, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussing the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the implementing United States legislation).
18Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Service Co., 796 P.2d 276, 285-86 (Ok. 1990).
19Id. at 286.  Unfortunately, the court simply asserted its conclusion by means of ipse dixit reasoning,
providing no guidance as to why these procedural variations did not undermine fundamental fairness.
The court’s opinion is representative, however, of the tendency of American courts not to reject foreign
judgments on the ground that foreign procedures do not meet the requirements of fundamental fairness.
20Will of Brown, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 341-42 (N.Y. Surrogate’s Court 1986).
21See, e.g., McCord v. Jet Spray International Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436, 439 (D. Mass. 1994); see also id.
(“The fact that Massachusetts and Belgium law differ with respect to employment contracts does not
make Belgium’s law contrary to Massachusetts’ public policy.”).  
22See, e.g., Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856, 861(Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
23See, e.g., Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Service Co., 796 P.2d 276, 283 (Ok. 1990).
24Schwartz v. Schwartz, 676 N.Y.S.2d 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); see also id. (“Under the doctrine of
comity, New York State courts must recognize judgments rendered in a foreign country absent some
showing of fraud in the procurement of the foreign judgment, or a determination that recognition of the
judgment would do violence to some strong public policy of this State”).
Act and the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards – are structured along the same lines as the
Restatement.  They require that a United States court enforce the judgment or
arbitral award unless there is fraud or if doing so would be repugnant to the
public policy of the enforcing forum.17
Both caveats to the general rule of enforcement have been construed
narrowly.  Consider first the requirement that procedures not be
fundamentally unfair.   In one representative case, a court enforced a Brazilian
judgment despite the fact that under Brazilian law “(1) no witnesses of any
party may be subpoenaed, (2) testimony of corporate employees is
inadmissible, (3) there is no available process for requiring testimony of
indispensable U.S. witnesses; (4) there is no right of cross-examination, and (5)
the parties may neither conduct pre-trial discovery nor subpoena
documents.”18  The court concluded that “[a]lthough Brazilian norms of
procedure differ from ours, that is not a basis for their condemnation as falling
short of the minimum due process standards in the Anglo-American sense.”19
Consider next the second caveat.  The vast majority of American
courts have interpreted the public policy exception very narrowly.  Most
commonly, enforcement is deemed to violate public policy only if enforcing
the judgment is deemed to be “repugnant”; a common formulation is that
“[t]he public policy exception to the doctrine of comity is usually invoked only
in the rare instance ‘where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental
notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.’”20
Courts refer to the public policy exception as a “high standard”21 that is
“narrow in scope,”22 and as a doctrine that is available only in “exceptional
cases”23 or the “rare case.”24  As another court has accurately stated: 
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25See Milhoux, 902 P.2d at 861(quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (NY 1918), and
enforcing Belgian judgment, though it was based on Belgian law providing a 30-year statute of limitations).
The Milhoux case did not differentiate between public policy in relation to the application of law (as was
the issue in Loucks) and public policy in relation to judgments (this issue in Milhoux).  This is the norm.
See, e.g., cite.  I leave for another day the question of whether the scope of public policy should vary as
between laws and judgments.  
26Id.
27A similar pattern arises in the related context of judicial enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  The
United States has joined an international convention on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards that
contains a public policy exception.  As one scholar has observed, “the courts have given the public policy
defense [of the international convention] so narrow a construction that it now must be characterized as
a defense  without meaningful definition [and consequently leaves] the defense pragmatically useless if not
altogether nonexistent.”   Berglin, The Application in United States Courts of the Public Policy Provision of the
Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 4 Dick J. Int’l L. 167, 169 (1986). Consider a case in
which an American company providing services to a company in Egypt was unable to complete its
contractual obligations when Egypt broke diplomatic relations with the United States and ordered all
Americans out of the country, prompting the State Department to order the company to cease
performance of its contract.  See  Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de
L’Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). The International Chamber of Commerce issued
an award in favor of the Egyptian company, and the Second Circuit enforced the award over the
American company’s invocation of the public policy exception.  “To deny enforcement of this award
largely because of the United States’ falling out with Egypt in recent years,” stated the court, “would mean
converting a defense intended to be of narrow scope into a major loophole in the Convention’s
mechanism for enforcement.  We have little hesitation, therefore, in disallowing [the American company’s]
proposed public policy defense.” Id.  Consider how extraordinarily narrow a conception of the public
policy exception this reflects: it does not violate U.S. policy to enforce an award for breach of contract
where the breaching party had been ordered to cease work on the contract by the United States State
Department in response to a foreign country breaking diplomatic relations with the United States.
28Neporany v. Kir, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (1958).
[C]ourts in the United States normally will not deny recognition
merely because the law or practice of the foreign country differs,
even if markedly from that of the recognition forum . . . . As Judge
Cardozo observed: ‘We are not so provincial as to say that every
solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at
home.’25
This is consistent with the instructions of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, which provides that foreign judgments should be enforced
even if “the original claim could not have been maintained in a State of the
United States.”26   
Case holdings are consistent with this judicial rhetoric.27  Courts
consistently have enforced foreign judgments even if they would have refused
to entertain suit on the original claim on grounds of public policy.  For
example, one state court enforced a Canadian judgment based on the tort of
seduction and criminal conversation despite the fact that the state legislature
had abolished actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation as
contrary to the state’s public policy.28  Stated the court, “our public policy is
not contravened by the enforcement of a money judgment arising from causes
of action proscribed [under state law] but which are recognized in the
jurisdiction where the acts took place, and the comity of nations calls for
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29Id. at 148.
30Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E. 2d 709 (NY 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966).
31Jaffe v. Snow, 610 So. 2d 482, 485-87 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).  Mr. Jaffe posted bail after he was indicted
in Florida.  He thereafter fled to Canada, failing to show for his trial.  The company that had posted his
bail sent bondsmen to Canada to forcefully return Jaffe to the United States, as Florida law permitted.
Such forceful abduction, however, was both  tortious and criminal under Canada law.  The bondsmen
were successful; Jaffe was returned, tried, and convicted. After conviction, Jaffe was indicted on charges
relating to organized crime.  Soon thereafter, his conviction was overturned on technical grounds.  Freed
from jail on the overturned conviction, he posted bond for his second indictment and fled once again to
Canada.  In their new frozen home, Jaffe and his wife successfully sued the bondsmen in Canada for
having committed a tortious abduction on Canadian soil.  Jaffe’s wife initiated an action in a Florida court
to enforce the Canadian judgment.  
The state court in Jaffe v. Snow refused to enforce the judgment on the ground of public policy.
The court made clear, however, that it did not refuse to enforce the judgment simply because Canadian
law differed from American law in respect of forceful abductions.  Rather, enforcing the judgment would
have violated public policy because Jaffe was a fugitive from justice and, as such, was “not entitled to call
upon the resources of a court for determination of his case.” Id. at 485.  Furthermore, the court reasoned
that because he “flout[ed] the orders of courts in this state” and already was in contempt of court, he
should not be permitted to “benefit from his own wrongful act.” Id. at 485-87.
32See also Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997) (U.S.
courts “ordinarily refuse to review acts of foreign governments and defer to proceedings taking place in
foreign countries, allowing those acts and proceedings to have extraterritorial effect in the United States.”);
State v. Meyer, 613 P.2d 132 (Wash. App. 1980) (“The doctrine of comity directs that we give full effect
to foreign judgments, except in extraordinary cases.”).
33They are:  Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), and
Telnikoff v. Matesuvitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. Ct. App. 1997).
34See Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 1994 WL 419847 *1(S.D.N.Y. 1994)(adapting this
constitutional analysis to the choice of law context; relying on Bachchan in refusing to apply British
defamation law); Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 676-77 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 954 F.2d
giving full effect to this foreign judgment.”29  Another court gave effect to a
“quickie” Mexican divorce that had been issued to the state’s residents, even
though the divorce was based on grounds that were not predicates for divorce
in that state.30   In one of the few cases outside the context of Un-American
Judgments where an American court has refused to enforce a foreign
judgment, the court stressed that it refused enforcement not because Canadian
law differed from American law, but because enforcement would have
violated American public policy insofar as the party seeking enforcement was
a fugitive from justice who was “not entitled to call upon the resources of the
court for determination of his case.”31
In short, the thresholds under both the fundamental unfairness and
public policy exceptions are high, with the result that United States courts
almost always enforce foreign judgments.32 
II.     THE EXCEPTIONAL TREATMENT OF UN-AMERICAN JUDGMENTS  
American courts have analyzed matters very differently, however,
when the foreign judgment touches on matters concerning speech or the
press, and have declined to enforce such foreign judgments.   Two of these
negative  decisions are gathering precedential force,33 as courts have begun to
rely on their analyses34 and scholarly commentators generally have praised
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1408 (7th cir. 1992) (adapting this constitutional analysis to the choice of law context; suggesting that “first
amendment protections” may extend to publications occurring out of the United States such that an
American court would be constitutionally disabled from applying a foreign country’s laws to publications
occurring within their borders.)
35See, e.g., LAURA R. HANDMAN & ROBERT D. BALIN, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN FOREIGN AND U.S.
DEFAMATION LAW: THE FIRST AMENDMENT GOES GLOBAL:  9 LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CTR. 50
-STATE SURVEY 1992-93, at xix (Henry R. Kaufman ed., 1993)(praising Bachchan); Comment, Jeff Sanders,
Extraterritorial Application of the First Amendment to Defamation Claims Against American Media, 19 N.C. J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 515, 552 (1994) (concluding that Bachchan was correctly decided); Eric P. Enson, A
Roadblock on the Detour Around the First Amendment: Is the Enforcement of English Libel Judgments in the United
States Unconstitutional?, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 159, 160 1999 (adopting reasoning of Bachchan and
Matusevich); Kyu Ho Youm, Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run Around U.S. Libel
Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 235, 256-62 (1994)(praising Bachchan).  One scholar recently has
provided a sharp critique of the courts’s state action analysis, but ultimately concludes that the question
of whether (what I call) Un-American Judgments should be enforced nonetheless may trigger
constitutional scrutiny.  See Van Houweling, Notes on the Next Yahoo!, supra note 8, at 713-16.
36585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
37Id. at 661.
38See End Run, supra note 35, at  246 & n. 85 (noting that Mr. Bachchan’s attorney argued that “assets
were unavailable in Britain”).
them.35
A.     Bachchan.  The first important decision came in the defamation
case of Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc..36  The plaintiff, Mr. Bachchan,
was an Indian national who resided in either England or Switzerland.  The
defendant, India Abroad Publications,  was a New York news service with a
subsidiary in England.  India Abroad transmitted reports abroad and printed
newspapers in the United States and England. The story in question reported
that Swiss authorities had frozen a bank account belonging to Mr. Bachchan
because the account was connected to a company that had been charged with
paying kickbacks to obtain contracts with the Indian government.  The story
had been written by a reporter in London and wired by India Abroad to a
news service in India.  From there, the story had appeared in two Indian
newspapers, copies of which were distributed in the United Kingdom.  The
story also was reported in an issue of the defendant’s New York newspaper,
India Abroad.  The company’s English subsidiary printed and distributed a
copy of India Abroad in England.37  
The report about Mr. Bachchan was incorrect.   Bachchan sued for
defamation in England on account of the false news reports that appeared in
the newspapers in England (but not the story published in the New York
newspaper).  The English court applied English defamation law and awarded
Bachchan a £40,000 judgment to be paid by India Abroad and its reporter.
Because the defendant’s assets were in the United States, however, Bachchan
sued in New York to enforce the British judgment.38 
The New York court declined to enforce the foreign judgment on
both constitutional and statutory grounds. The Bachchan court’s constitutional
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39Id. at 662.
40Id. at 663; see generally Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 247-49 (Md. Ct. App. 1997)(citing
English law and legal treatises).
41New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
42Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S. 2d at 663.
43Id. at 664-65.  The court’s statutory holding was derivative of its constitutional analysis.  It refused to
enforce the foreign judgment on the ground that it was “repugnant to the public policy of this state,” and
it determined that this test was met because English law did not conform to the First Amendment’s
defamation requirements.  Id. at 662.
44This dispute between these parties appeared not only on England but also in several jurisdictions in the
United States.  See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. Ct. App. 1997); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff,
877 F. Supp. 1 (D. D.C. 1995), aff’d by 159 F.3d 636 (D. C. Cir. 1998)(unpublished opinion).
holding turned on the fact that there are substantive differences between
English and American defamation law.  The court concluded that the United
States Constitution precluded enforcement of a foreign libel judgment based
on foreign law unless the law met “the safeguards for the press which have
been enunciated by the courts of this country.”39 English defamation law did
not pass muster under this test because it is more favorable to plaintiffs than
American law.  Under English law, published statements that adversely affect
a person’s reputation are prima facie defamatory.  Statements of fact are deemed
to be false, and the defendant bears the burden of establishing their truth.40
Furthermore, English defamation law does not distinguish between public and
private figures.  By contrast, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
the First Amendment allows a public official to recover damages for
defamation only if she establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant published allegedly defamatory material with “‘actual malice’ – that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.”41  
Mr. Bachchan would have qualified as a public figure under American
law if U.S. law had been applicable; he was a former member of Parliament
and the brother and manager of a movie star.42  Furthermore, the report
concerned a matter of public concern; an international scandal concerning
defense contracts.  Thus, in contrast to what would have been necessary under
U.S. defamation law, Mr. Bachchan had not been required under English law
to show that the press defendant acted with malice; the fact that the story
about him was false was sufficient to make India Abroad liable under English
law.  Because England “lack[ed] an equivalent to the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution,”the Bachchan court concluded,  “enforcement of
the English judgment would violate the First Amendment.”43  
B.     Telnikoff.  Consider next the case of Telnikoff v. Matusevitch.4 4
Matusevich, an English citizen of Russian descent, wrote a letter in England
that was published in the Daily Telegraph, an English newspaper, that
concerned the BBC’s recruitment policies for their Russian service.  In the
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45Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 256 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
46The procedural history of the English defamation case is somewhat complicated.  After the English trial
court had found in favor of the defendant, plaintiff Telnikoff appealed to the first level appellate court,
the Court of Appeal, which affirmed, and then to the House of Lords.  The House of Lords affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  It remanded the case with the instruction that when  determining whether the
letter was comment or fact – a legally relevant distinction under English defamation law –   the jury
should examine the letter by itself and not in context with Telnikoff’s original article, to which the
defendant’s letter had responded.   The jury then returned a verdict in Telnikoff’s favor.  Id. at 234-35.
47Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 4.
48Id. at 2-4 (declining to enforce British judgment pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. Section
10-704(b)(2), which states that a foreign judgment need not be recognized if “the cause of action on which
the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of the State”).
49Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 236.
50Id. at 239 & n. 15.
letter, Matusevich incorrectly accused Telnikoff of being anti-semitic and
racist. Both men were residents of England at the time of the letter’s
publication.45  Telnikoff sued Matusevitch  in an English court for defamation.
The plaintiff prevailed after a full and fair trial,46 and was awarded £240,000 in
damages.  Before plaintiff had collected his judgment, Mr. Matusevitch took
a new job, relocating himself and his assets to the United States.  
Mr. Telnikoff then sought to enforce the English judgment in a court
in the United States.  He sued in Maryland state court and the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia. In response, Mr. Matusevitch filed a declaratory
judgment action in federal district court, requesting a determination that the
British judgment could not be enforced.  The federal district court ruled in
favor of Mr. Matusevitch.  Like the court in Bachchan, the federal court in
Telnikoff  concluded that “recognition and enforcement of the foreign
judgment in this case would deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights”
under the First Amendment due to the differences between American and
English libel law.47  The federal court also based its holding on Maryland
statutory law, ruling that “libel standards that are contrary to U.S. libel
standards would be repugnant to the public policies of the State of Maryland
and the United States” and therefore did not have to be enforced under
Maryland’s Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act.48  The
federal court’s statutory analysis was parasitic on its constitutional
determination; English law was deemed “repugnant” simply because it did not
provide the First Amendment’s protections.
Mr. Telnikoff appealed.  After hearing oral argument, the United State
Court of Appeals certified a question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
asking whether recognition of Telnikoff’s foreign judgment would be
repugnant to the public policy of Maryland.49  Although Maryland’s high court
correctly understood that it had not been asked to decide “whether
recognition of the English judgment would directly violate the First
Amendment,”50 the court’s analysis of whether recognition would violate
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51See id. at 239 (“While we shall rest our decision in this case upon the non-constitutional ground of
Maryland public policy, nonetheless in ascertaining that public policy, it is appropriate to examine and rely
upon the history, policies, and requirements of the First Amendment . . . In determining non-
constitutional principles of law, courts often rely upon the policies and requirements reflected in
constitutional provisions.”); id. at 240-51.
52Id. at 250 (quoting Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S. 2d at 664).
53485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
54Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 251 (internal citation to Hustler Magazine omitted).
55See Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 159 F.3d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (table opinion); 1998 WL 388800.
56169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
5 7 S e e  A r t i c l e  R .  6 4 5 - 2  o f  t h e F r e n c h  p e n a l  c o d e ,  r e f e r en c e d  at
www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm.
Maryland public policy turned almost entirely on a review of the First
Amendment’s requirements and the observation that British libel law does not
incorporate the First Amendment’s protections.51   The Maryland court quoted
approvingly from Bachchan that “[t]he protection to free speech and the press
embodied in [the First A]mendment would be seriously jeopardized by the
entry of foreign libel judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed
appropriate in England but considered antithetical to the protections afforded
the press by the U.S. Constitution.”52  And the court’s final words were largely
a quotation from the well-known Supreme Court opinion of Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell:53
“At the heart of the First Amendment,” as well as Article 40 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights and Maryland public policy, “is the
recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas
and opinions on matter of public interest and concern.”  The
importance of that free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of
public concern precludes Maryland recognition of Telnikoff’s
English libel judgment.54 
In an unpublished opinion, the United States Appeals Court for the District
of Columbia affirmed the district court’s opinion.55  
C.     Yahoo!.  The most recent decision involving the enforcement of
Un-American judgments is Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L’Antisemitisme.56 Yahoo! is a California-based Internet Service Provider from
whose website people can readily access Yahoo! auction sites.  French law
prohibits the exhibition of Nazi propaganda and artifacts for sale57  – a
content-based restriction that no American polity could enact due to the First
Amendment.   Computer terminals in France were able to access an auction
site through Yahoo! on which Nazi memorabilia was offered for sale.  As a
consequence, two French non-profit organizations dedicated to eliminating
anti-Semitism sued Yahoo! in a French court for violating France’s anti-Nazi
law.  The High Court of Paris determined that it was technologically possible
for Yahoo! to block access to select sites (like the Nazi auction sites) only for
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58Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1191 & n. 10 (noting the “French Court’s factual determination that Yahoo!
does possess the technology to comply with the French order”).
59Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
60The French Court’s order provided that no assessed penalties could be collected from Yahoo! France,
a subsidiary of Yahoo! whose site was in compliance with the French law.  Id.
61French law accorded Yahoo! the opportunity to appeal the French Court’s order, but this Yahoo! did
not do.   This raises the interesting question of whether the U.S. District Court should have required
Yahoo!  to first have exhaust its French remedies before seeking a declaration that an American court
would not enforce the judgment.  As a doctrinal matter, this could have been accomplished by means of
abstention for the purpose of minimizing friction as between the United States and other countries.  Cf.
Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1521 (11th Cir. 1994) (United States
court abstains pending resolution of German litigation).
62See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. 
63Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1194; see also id. at 1191-92 (noting that “the purpose of the present action
is to determine whether a United States court may enforce the French order without running afoul of the
First Amendment.”); id. at 1189 (identifying the French order and then stating that “[a] United States
court constitutionally could not make such an order”); id. at 1194 (granting Yahoo!’s motion for summary
judgment seeking a declaration that “the First Amendment precludes enforcement within the United
States of a French order intended to regulate the content of its speech over the Internet”).
64334 U.S. 1 (1948).  I discuss Shelley at length below in Part II.B.1.
65Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
66Id.
computers sitting in France.58 It ordered Yahoo! to do so, prescribing a penalty
of 100,000 Francs (approximately U.S. $13,300) for each day of non-
compliance.59
The Yahoo! computers that were ordered to be reconfigured and
Yahoo!’s assets, however, were located in the United States.60  Yahoo! filed an
action in a United States district court,61 seeking a declaratory judgment that
enforcing the French order would violate the First Amendment.  Relying on
Bachchan and Telnikoff62 the district court granted Yahoo!’s motion, finding that
“the First Amendment precludes enforcement within the United States of a
French order intended to regulate the content of its speech over the
Internet.”63  The district court’s reasoning was terse.  Citing to Shelley v.
Kraemer,64 the case in which the Supreme Court ruled that the Equal Protection
Clause precluded a court from enforcing a racially restrictive covenant, the
court simply asserted that 
[t]he French order prohibits the sale or display of items based on
their association with a particular political organization and bans the
display of websites based on the authors’ viewpoint with respect to
the Holocaust and anti-Semitism.  A United States court
constitutionally could not make such an order.  Shelley v. Kraemer.
The First Amendment does not permit the government to engage
in viewpoint-based regulation of speech absent a compelling
governmental interest, such as averting a clear and present danger
of imminent violence.65
The district court accordingly granted Yahoo!’s motion for summary
judgment.66  The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit on non-constitutional
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67The French parties argued in their appeal that the U.S. court lacked jurisdiction over them. 
68As discussed below in Part II.B.3(c), the case of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982),
makes clear that state action also will be found where a court acts pursuant to a specially created legislative
procedural device.  In such cases, however, only the court’s procedures constitute state action.  The
underlying privately created right is not attributed to the state under the state action doctrine.  See infra
p.  24.  This means that even if there were a special statutory procedure for enforcing foreign judgments
(that, for example, for adopted by Congress pursuant to an  international treaty), it would not be
unconstitutional to enforce an Un-American judgment.   Id.  
69See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
70George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against
abridgement by government, federal or state.”).
71See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
72See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 483-84 (2d. ed. 2002).
73Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381-83 (1896).  For a more recent statement of this principle, see
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978).
grounds,67 but the appeal was dropped before the Ninth Circuit had an
opportunity to rule.
III.     THE COURTS’ MISTAKEN STATE ACTION ANALYSIS
This Part III explains why the courts’s constitutional analysis is
mistaken.  The First Amendment does not preclude an American court from
enforcing a foreign judgment that is based on substantive law that an
American polity could not have enacted due to the First Amendment because
the substance of the judgment would not be attributed to the court for
purposes of the state action doctrine. Attribution to the court occurs only if
the underlying legal right was created by an American polity.68  There is no
state action as regards the enforcement of Un-American Judgments because
the underlying legal right was not created by an American polity.  This Part
also explains why this aspect of contemporary state action doctrine is
normatively desire. 
A.    Threshold Considerations Concerning the Constitution’s Applicability: With
the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery, the United
States Constitution limits governmental units, not individuals.69  It follows
from this that “the First Amendment protects individuals only from
government, not private, infringements upon speech rights.”70   Furthermore,
not all governments are subject to the Constitution’s constraints.  For about
the first half of our country’s history, for example, the First Amendment and
the other guarantees found in the Bill of Rights were limitations that operated
only against the federal government.71  While most of the Bill of Rights have
been incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment,
several provisions still do not apply to states.72  And it is well established that
the Constitution does not impose limitations on non-U.S. polities, such as
tribal governments73 and foreign countries.
Accordingly, it is clear that the First Amendment has absolutely
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74Below I discuss and critique the position that even contractual rights are properly viewed as being public.
See infra Part II.B.3.
75334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
76This question of whether judicial enforcement of a legal right not created by government  makes the
substance of the right attributable to the government for constitutional purposes also arises with regard
to federal courts.   Although virtually all such questions have arisen in the context of state court
enforcement of contracts, the same analysis that follows in text would apply to federal courts, for the
Supreme Court regularly invokes the state action doctrine when seeking to determine whether an entity
is to be considered part of the federal government for purposes of subjecting it to constitutional
limitations.  See, e.g., Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 973-74 (1995) (relying
on state action doctrine with regard to state governments to determine whether federal corporation
Amtrak’s rejection of artist’s lease of billboard space was subject to First Amendment constraints).
nothing to say about the French legislature’s decision to enact a law that
engages in viewpoint discrimination by singling out Nazi artifacts.  The First
Amendment similarly is mute in respect of a French court’s application of the
French law and its issuance of a judgment, even against an American citizen,
assessing penalties or an injunction in response to the law’s having been
violated.  The First Amendment (or any other United States constitutional
provision) potentially comes into play only when a court in the United States
– a governmental entity governed by the Constitution –  is asked to enforce
the foreign judgment.
The issue thus is to what extent, if any, an American court’s
enforcement of legal rights not created by an American polity triggers United
States constitutional protections.  There is a large set of cases that has explored
this question in the context of contractual rights, that is, legal rights created
not by an American polity but by private actors.74  This body of law is  part of
what is known as the state action doctrine, and Shelley v. Kraemer75 – the case in
which the Supreme Court declared that a state court violates the Equal
Protection Clause when it enforces a racially restrictive covenant contained in
a contract between private parties –   is one of the most famous cases in this
field.76   This Article, however, is concerned with legal rights created not by
private individuals via contract, but by a foreign country’s regulations.  There
is virtually no case law set in this particular context aside from the recent Un-
American Judgment cases we have just discussed. To the extent these cases
include any state action analysis at all, as analytical correctness requires, they
have relied exclusively on Shelley v. Kraemer (which, as stated above, deals with
a privately created right).
After examining Shelley in Part III.B.(1), this Part shows that the cases
deciding not to enforce Un-American Judgments have relied on an extension
of Shelley that has never been made.  Courts today regularly enforce private
contractual terms that inhibit speech in ways that the Constitution would
disallow an American  government from doing.  Contemporary state action
doctrine relies heavily on the distinction between “private” activity that is
immune from constitutional regulation and  “public” activity that is subject to
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77334 U.S. 1 (1948).
78Id. at 4-5.
79Id. at 21.
constitutional limitation, and characterizes as private those legal rights that
have not been created by an American polity, even when a party enforces that
legal right in an American court.  Part III.B. then defends the current doctrine
against the criticisms that have been leveled against the “public”/”private”
distinction by generations of progressive legal scholars.  Finally,  Part III.C.
explains why  foreign law should be treated no differently than a private
contract for purposes of determining whether enforcement amounts to state
action.
It follows that an American court’s enforcement of an Un-American
Judgment is no more unconstitutional than the enforcement of a contractual
provision that an American polity could not have constitutionally enacted as
a statute.  In today’s beyond-Shelley world, this means that the enforcement of
Un-American Judgments does not raise constitutional issues, and the First
Amendment analysis found in such cases as Bachchan, Telnikoff, and Yahoo! is
wholly misplaced.
B.     The State Action Doctrine
1.     Shelley v. Kraemer.  To analyze whether court  orders
constitute state action, one must begin with the case of Shelley v. Kraemer.77  In
1911, thirty property owners, who together owned forty-seven mostly
contiguous parcels of land in Missouri, signed a private contract intended to
run with the land, that accordingly was recorded thereafter.  The agreement
was a restrictive covenant providing that a condition precedent to the sale of
any and all properties was that they should not be occupied by “any person
not of the Caucasian race.”78  In exchange for valuable consideration, Mr. and
Mrs. Shelley, who were African-Americans, received a warranty deed to one
of the parcels of land subject to the restrictive covenant from one Mr.
Fitzgerald.  Kraemer, an owner of one of the other parcels of land, thereafter
sued in state court, asking the court to enforce the agreement and divest title
out of the Shelleys.  The Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that the covenant
should be enforced.  
The United States Supreme Court famously reversed, holding that
judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenant would violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.79  Arriving at so normatively
attractive an outcome, however, was not doctrinally simple.  The chief
obstacle was the understanding that “the action inhibited by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be
that of the States.  That Amendment erects no shield against merely private









88See supra at p. 24.
89See Shelley, 334 U.S. at  21.
90Id. at 20-21.
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”80  Thus even though
“restrictions on the right of occupancy of the sort sought to be created by the
private agreements in these cases could not be squared with the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state statute or local
ordinance,”81 the restrictive covenant in this case did “not involve action by
state legislatures or city councils.”82  The Court accordingly held that the
restrictive agreements “standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment” and hence were not
themselves unconstitutional.83  
But the Court’s analysis did not end there.  Though the restrictive
covenant itself could not be said to be “action by the State” triggering the
Fourteenth Amendment,84 the Court ruled that “the action of state courts and
of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the
State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”85  After all, the “full
coercive power of government” was being used to “to deny to petitioners, on
the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights.”86  Furthermore,
because enforcement orders  came from courts, the “judicial action in each case
bears the clear and unmistakable imprimatur of the State.”87 
One analytical step remained.  After establishing that a court’s order to
enforce a contract constituted state action,  the question became what aspects
of the enforcement order were attributable to the State. Without explanation,
the Court determined that the  substantive provisions of the contract
themselves were appropriately deemed to be action of the state.  (As will be
discussed below, this is not the only plausible answer to the question88).  Under
the Shelley Court’s approach, the question became whether a state could have
enacted into general law the contract’s substantive provision.89  Because it could
not have, it  readily followed that enforcing the restrictive covenant also
violated the guarantee of equal protection.90    
As discussed above, several of the courts that categorically have refused
to enforce foreign judgments relied heavily on Shelley.  Their analysis cleaves
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91As an analytical matter, a more direct precedent for Bachchan, Telnikoff and Yahoo!   would have been
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1953).  Relying on Shelley, the Court in Barrows held that an
award of monetary damages by a state court in favor of one of the convenantors violates equal protection.
Id. at 260.  Like Barrows, and unlike Shelley, Bachchan and Telnikoff  concerned damages, not injunctive relief.
Like Barrows, and unlike Shelley, the defendants in Bachchan, Telnikoff and Yahoo!   were covenantors.  The
three courts’ reliance on Shelley rather than Barrows, however, does not change the analysis above in text.
The Barrows Court itself based itself solely on Shelley, and the analysis that follows in the text is equally
applicable to Barrows.
92See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d ed. 1988)(Shelley’s approach,
“consistently applied, would require individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional
standards whenever, as almost always, the individuals might later seek the security of potential judicial
enforcement.”). 
93Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 253 (Cal. App. 2001). 
94See Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 647, 651 (2002) (noting that the Court has only “very
rarely” upheld content-based restrictions under the compelling government interest test).
quite closely to the holding in that case.91 The approach under Shelley is to ask
whether the substantive provision of the contract the court is asked to enforce
could have been enacted into general law by the state.  Applying this analysis
to the foreign judgments in Bachchan, Telnikoff, and Yahoo! readily yields the
following result: because the First Amendment prevents a state from adopting
England’s defamation law or France’s hate speech law, an American court’s
enforcement of a foreign judgment based on the English or French law
likewise would violate the First Amendment.
2.     The Modern Case law.  The problem with the recent cases’
categorical refusal to enforce foreign judgments is not that they misunderstand
Shelley, but that they have overlooked that Shelley has been importantly
narrowed by subsequent case law.  Shelley’s holding was troubling to American
courts and commentators alike because, under its reasoning, every private
contract that a party wishes to judicially enforce triggers state action such that
the substantive provisions of the contract are attributed to the state.92  “Such
application [erodes] the distinction between public and private action.”93  
The following hypothetical helps illustrate the distinction between
“public” and “private” action and highlight what is at stake in determining the
scope of the state action doctrine.  Imagine that the principal of a private
school in New York does not want any books concerning the Nazis to be sent
to his school, and that he enters into a contract with a New York bookseller
that provides that “Nazi materials shall not be shipped” to the school.  If the
state legislature sought to enact such a provision into general law, such
viewpoint discrimination would trigger strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment and almost certainly would be struck down.94  The question
presented under the state action doctrine is as follows: if the bookseller
breaches the contract by sending Nazi materials to the private school, would
the principal’s attempt to enforce his rights under the contract by suing in court
constitute state action such that the substantive contractual provisions are
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95See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying
Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1268 (2000) (noting that courts have
been “unmoved” and “most Americans are likely to resist, on an intuitive level, scholarly attempts to
erode the distinction between public and private.”) [hereinafter, Berman, Cultural Value].
96The case that most directly supports this proposition is Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,  834, 842
(1982), where the Court found no state action when a private school that received virtually all its funding
from the government (from 90 to 99% over a several year period) fired a teacher on the basis of her
speech.
97See also infra note 68 (explaining the Lugar rule with regard to statutory procedures).  It is important to
note that  although contemporary state action law has not extended Shelley’s rule  outside the context of
racial discrimination, it has not addressed the state action doctrine’s application to issues of racial
discrimination.  For more on this point, see infra note 132.
98Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Association, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (Cal. 2001).
99Id. at 1034.
attributed to the state, as Shelley’s analysis would suggest?  If so, then judicial
enforcement of this provision of the contract would violate the First
Amendment.  As a practical matter, such an outcome would shrink the scope
of autonomy people had in creating contractual obligations; the only
contractual provisions that would be judicially enforceable would be those that
a state could enact as general law, and an unenforceable contractual provision
is worth little, if anything.  It is in this sense that Shelley threatened to erase the
distinction between “private” action (e.g., the principal and bookseller’s
contract) and “public” action (i.e., action of the state legislature in prohibiting
Nazi materials in state schools).    
In fact, as even critics of the distinction between public and private
action concede,95 and as those familiar with American legal culture undoubtedly
know as an intuitive matter, courts would enforce the principal’s contract.96  As
shown below, American courts regularly issue orders that would have been
subject to constitutional constraints (and in all likelihood found to be
constitutionally infirm) if they had been enacted by a state legislature as a
general law.  Arguments that such court orders qualify as state action under
Shelley, and accordingly trigger constitutional scrutiny, have been regularly
rebuffed.  The general rule outside the context of racial discrimination appears
to be as follows:  the underlying legal right will be attributed to the state under
the state action doctrine only if government is the source of the underlying
right.97 
(a)     Judicial Enforcement of  Limitations on Speech.  First, consider
several cases that concerned the question of whether the judicial enforcement
of private contracts limiting speech constituted  state action. Plaintiffs in one
case sued in state court to enforce a provision in a lease agreement that
prohibited tenants from distributing unsolicited newspapers.98  The defendants
cited to Shelley and argued that enforcement of the provision would constitute
state action, triggering heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.99  An
appeals court in California rejected this argument and issued the requested
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100Id.  For more on the fact that Shelley has been limited to the racial context, see infra note 132.
101A few older decisions have held otherwise. See, e.g., Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358
So.2d 1084, 1087-88 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977) (enforcement of restrictive covenant barring children under
the age of 12 to be unconstitutional), aff’d by 379 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1979); West Hill Baptist Church v.
Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ohio Common Pleas 1969) (finding that judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenant excluding houses of worship constitutes state action).  I have not found recent cases that have
similarly held.   
102Linn Valley Lakes Property Owners Assocation v. Brockway, 824 P.2d 948, 951 (Kan. 1992).
103Id. The Kansas Supreme Court  did not provide much in the way of explanation as to why  the facts
it relied on to distinguish Shelley mattered. The Court’s ready limiting of Shelley suggests the extent to
which Shelley’s approach simply does not comport with the deeper contemporary legal culture; Shelley’s
inapplicability was so obvious to the court as not to require significant discussion. 
104Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condominium Association v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996).
105State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858 (Wash. App. Ct. 2000), review denied by Calof v. Casebber, 22 P.3d 802 (Wash.
2001).
injunction, reasoning that “[a]lthough the United States Supreme Court has
held that judicial effectuation of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state
action, it has largely limited this holding to the facts of those cases.”100  Thus,
even though the Constitution would have imposed limitations had an American
polity created the restriction on newspaper solicitation, there was no state
action (and hence no constitutional limitations that were applicable) where a
court enforced a restriction that had not been created by an American polity,
but instead had been created by private parties through contract.  The source
of the legal right hence was constitutionally dispositive: because the right to not
receive unsolicited newspapers had its source in private contract rather than
legislation, judicial enforcement of the right did not constitute state action.
Indeed, with virtually no exceptions, courts have concluded that the
judicial enforcement of private agreements that inhibit speech do not trigger
constitutional review despite the fact that identical legislative limitations on
speech would have.101  Consider, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court’s
ruling that judicially enforcing a restrictive covenant barring the posting of
signs does not qualify as state action.102  In finding Shelley to be inapplicable, the
Kansas court rejected the position that “the test to be employed is whether a
valid ordinance could be passed prohibiting the conduct proscribed in the
restrictive covenant.”103  In other words, the court explicitly rejected the view
that the source of the underlying right is irrelevant to state action analysis.  In
another case, a Pennsylvania court held that judicial enforcement of a
condominium association’s prohibition on the posting of “for sale” signs was
not state action and consequently did not trigger First Amendment concerns.104
Yet another state appellate court confronted the question of whether the First
Amendment precluded it from enforcing a settlement agreement in which a
person had agreed not to publicly criticize a certain type of psychological
therapy.105  Despite the fact that the party’s speech was deemed to be in the
public interest, the court determined that enforcement did not constitute state
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106Id. at 870.
107Id at 871 (emphasis supplied).
108See CompuServe Incorporated v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
109Id. at 1025.
110Id. at 1026.  See infra note 122 (questioning this analysis).
111Cyber Promotions v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 444-45 (E.D. Pa. 1996).  The court’s
observation in this case was only dicta, however, because the party wishing to block the e-mails had the
technology to do so.  The court accordingly was not asked to issue an order enjoining the other party
from sending the unwanted e-mails.  
action and upheld the agreement.  The court rejected the argument, based on
Shelley, that “judicial enforcement of a settlement agreement constitutes state
action.”106 The court’s analysis was unaffected by the fact that free speech rights
were at issue.  Upholding the settlement agreement, the court said that “[s]tate
enforcement of a contract between two private parties is not state action, even where one party’s
free speech rights are restricted by that agreement.  Therefore, the settlement agreement
. . . contains no constitutional First Amendment infirmity precluding its
enforcement.”107 
In another case, CompuServe, the Internet Service Provider, claimed
that another company committed trespass by sending unsolicited e-mails to
CompuServe’s computer systems.  CompuServe sought a preliminary
injunction enjoining the defendant from sending its unsolicited advertisements
to the e-mail addresses that were maintained by CompuServe.108 In response to
CompuServe’s request, the defendant argued that it had “the right to continue
to send unsolicited commercial e-mail to plaintiff’s computer systems under the
First Amendment.”1 0 9  The district court rejected this, holding that “the mere
judicial enforcement” of rights founded even on state law – in this case, a
trespass law –  did “not alone render [the court] a state actor.”110  The court
then enjoined the defendant from sending unsolicited mail to CompuServe.
In another case involving an Internet Service Provider’s attempt to block
unsolicited e-mails, a different federal district court similarly rejected the
argument that “the Court’s participation with the litigant in issuing or enforcing
an order which impinges on another’s First Amendment rights”constitutes state
action.111
(b)     Enforcement of Arbitration Orders and Due Process.
Other courts have found no state action in cases where their orders could have
been said to implicate constitutional rights other than the First Amendment.
For example, several courts have been confronted with the question of whether
court involvement in the arbitration process  constitutes state action. One
federal court in the Southern District of New York rejected the claim that court
approval of the use of arbitration itself created state action, noting that under
such an approach “all arbitrations could be subject to due process limitations
through the simple act of appealing the arbitrators’ decisions to the court
[2003]                                Exporting the Constitution                                    22
112United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 708 F.Supp. 95, 96-97
(S.D.N.Y.1989).
113499 U.S. 1 (1991).
114See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1; Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
115Id. at 1190 (quoting Lee v. Chica, 989 F.2d 883, 889 (8th Cir.) (Beam, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (1993)).
116Davis, 59 F.3d at 1190.
117Id. at 1191.  The court cited to many other decisions that came to this same conclusion, including
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 987 (1988); Elmore v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986); and
International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers Local Union 42 v. Absolute
Environmental Services, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 392, 402-03 (D. Del. 1993).
118Id. at 1191-92.
119Id.  For more discussion on the fact that Shelley has not been extended beyond race discrimination, see
infra note 132.
system.”112 In another case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit confronted the question of whether judicial enforcement of an
arbitration award for punitive damages constituted state action implicating due
process protections.  The petitioner’s argument was straightforward.  The
Supreme Court had ruled in the case of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip113 that due process demands that  courts use specific procedures before
imposing punitive damages.114 Arbitration panels that issue punitive damages,
however, do not utilize the Haslip procedures.  Indeed, as the federal appeals
court noted, 
in the arbitration setting we have almost none of the protections that
fundamental fairness and due process require for the imposition of
this sort of punishment.  Discovery is abbreviated if available at all.
The rules of evidence are employed, if at all, in a very relaxed
manner.  The factfinders (here the panel) operate with almost none
of the controls and safeguards assumed in Haslip.115
The appellate court nevertheless held that judicial enforcement of arbitral
awards of punitive damages did not constitute state action.116  There were two
steps in the appellate court’s reasoning process.  First, “the state action element
of a due process claim is absent in private arbitration cases” despite the fact
that Congress has regulated the arbitration process.117  Second, a court’s
confirmation of an arbitral award, even one for punitive damages, does not
constitute state action.118   In so ruling, the court limited Shelley:  
The holding of Shelley . . .  has not been extended beyond the context
of race discrimination . . . . Instead, the concept of state action has
since been narrowed by the Supreme Court . . . .  We likewise decline
to extend Shelley and hold that the mere confirmation of a private
arbitration award by a district court is insufficient state action to
trigger the application of the Due Process Clause.119
(c)     Limited Instances where Judicial Action Constitutes State
[2003]                                Exporting the Constitution                                    23
120501 U.S. 663 (1991).    
121Id. at 668.   
122See, e.g., State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 85, 871 (Wash. App. Ct. 2000), review denied by Calof v. Casebeer, 22 P.3d
802 (Wash. 2001) (distinguishing Cohen case on the basis that “[i]n Cohen, the state created the duty before
it enforced that duty. Unlike Cohen, judicial enforcement of the settlement agreement does not require
application of a state common law doctrine to create the duty enforced.  For the existence of a First
Amendment violation, state action is required. State enforcement of a contract between two private parties
is not state action, even where one party's free speech rights are restricted by that agreement. Therefore,
the settlement agreement between [the parties] contains no constitutional First Amendment infirmity
precluding its enforcement.”).   It is difficult, however, to reconcile Cohen with the CompuServe case
discussed above, where the district court held that enforcement of a state common law nuisance rule did
not constitute state action.
123457 U.S. 922 (1982).
124Id. at 937.  Without this second requirement “private parties could face constitutional litigation
whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community
surrounding them.”  Id.  After all, it could be said that the source of a court’s authority always comes from
an American polity (and hence satisfies the first prong)  insofar as the state or federal government created
the court.   Without offering a principled explanation, the Supreme Court appears to have read a caveat
into the first prong: unusual court procedures that go beyond some unstated and undefended baseline
group of court powers will be deemed to satisfy the test, but not those procedures that are part and parcel
of judicial process, such as a “mere . . . general statute of limitations.” Tulsa Professional Collection
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988).  In a recent case the Court appears to have conjoined the
two pronged test into one, holding that “when private parties make use of state procedures with the overt,
significant assistance of state officials, state action may be found.”  Id. at 486.
Action.  In limited circumstances judicial enforcement will qualify as state
action.  One example is where the legal right asserted by the party is judicially
created.  In Cohen v. Cowles Media,120 for example, the plaintiff’s only possible
basis for recovery was the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel.  The
Supreme Court held that the application of this state-law doctrine “in the
absence of a contract creates obligations never explicitly assumed by the
parties. These legal obligations would be enforced through the official power
of the Minnesota courts. Under our cases, that is enough to constitute ‘state
action’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”121  By contrast, the cases
surveyed above in which no state action was found involved circumstances in
which the legal rights sued upon were created by the parties themselves
pursuant to contract.122  The mere fact that state law did not proscribe such
agreements was not enough to make the substance of the parties’ agreement
attributable to the state for purposes of the state action doctrine.
A second circumstance where a court’s activities have been found to
constitute state action is where the remedy applied by the court was created by
the state legislature.   For example, in the case of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,123
the Supreme Court found state action where a creditor had obtained a writ of
prejudgment attachment from a state court.  The Court’s ruling turned on the
fact that the complaining party’s deprivation was “caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the state”124 – namely, the “procedural
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125Id. at 941.  Lugar involved the peculiar circumstance of a plaintiff trying to establish that a private
individual qualified as a state actor and hence was directly liable under 42 U.S.C.  §1983.   A second
requirement identified by the Lugar Court is that “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor” because, inter alia, “he has acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials.” Id. at 937. The Court deemed the private party’s “joint participation
with state officials in the seizure of disputed property” sufficient to satisfy this second test.  Id. at 941-42.
126See, e.g., Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486-87(holding that  although a general statute of limitations does not trigger
state action, a state probate code’s “nonclaim statute” does qualify as state action because the statute is
not “self-executing” insofar as it begins to run only after the probate court has done all sorts of things;
due process accordingly requires actual notice to reasonable ascertainable creditors); Davis Oil Co. v.
Mills, 873 F.2d 774, 781 & n. 12 (5th Cir.  1989)(foreclosure sale constituted state action; “In this case, as
in Lugar and the other prejudgment attachment cases, the claim is not simply that the private defendant
acted "with the knowledge of and pursuant to" the state procedural scheme in conducting a private sale.
 Under the Louisiana procedure, the sheriff seizes the property and advertises and conducts the sale.  State
law provides that property sold pursuant to this procedure will pass, free of all junior encumbrances, to
the purchaser;.” due process does not require actual notice, however); Argonaut Financial Services, Inc.,
164 B.R. 107 (N.D.Cal.1994) (bankruptcy proceedings are state action, requiring actual notice to
creditors).
127See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42.  Similarly, the Court has determined that the special statute of limitations
known as a “nonclaim statute” is properly attributable to the state.   See Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486-87. 
128326 U.S. 501 (1946).
scheme created by the statute.”125  While Lugar’s reasoning and result are
sensible, it is important to understand why the case is not a reincarnation of
Shelley.  Even when Lugar and its progeny126 find court action to constitute state
action, not all aspects of what is enforced are attributable to the state and
accordingly subject to constitutional limitations; attributed to the state are the
(statutory) rules that govern the attachment procedure,127  but not the
underlying legal right on which the party is suing.  To illustrate, under the rule
of Lugar, the judicial enforcement procedures by which Mr. Shelley could have
had his deed removed from him constitute state action.  It is only under the
approach of Shelley, however, that the underlying contractual right on which
Mr. Shelley sued would be attributed to the state under the state action
doctrine.  This explains why  Lugar  does not lead to the conclusion that a
United States treaty commitment to enforce foreign judgments would make it
unconstitutional to enforce Un-American judgments.  Even if judicial
enforcement were treated as a legal right created by an American polity under
the treaty power, state action would extend only to the procedures of
enforcement, not to the underlying (foreign) legal right itself.  
At this point, it is important to respond to a challenge that some
readers have brought to this Article’s focus on Shelley.  They have objected that
the most compelling precedent for analyzing the enforcement of foreign
judgments is provided by Marsh v. Alabama,128 not Shelley.  In Marsh, the Supreme
Court applied the First Amendment to a “company town” that refused to allow
solicitation of its inhabitants without prior written permission.  Even though
the “town” was not incorporated under state law, but was owned entirely by
a company, the Court found state action.  If a company town can qualify as a
state actor, the argument goes, then surely England or France – two full
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129The Court has held that the constitution does not apply to privately owned shopping centers, see
Hudges v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976), and countless lower courts have
ruled that enforcing the regulations adopted by condominiums does not constitute state action.  See supra
Part II.B.2(a).  
130
One caveat is in order: perhaps U.S. constitutional limitations should apply to foreign regulations
adopted at the behest of the United States such that the foreign country functioned as an agent of the
United States.  The British defamation and French hate speech laws clearly do not qualify as such
regulations.e
131For two older cases that are exceptions, see supra note 101.
132See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191-92(11th Cir. 1996) (“The holding of
Shelley, however, has not been extended beyond the context of race discrimination:); Midlake on Big
Boulder Lake v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa. Super. 1996) (“there is no state action for
constitutional purposes in the absence of a finding that racial discrimination is involved as existed in the
Shelley case”).  Relatedly, some cases have limited Shelley to circumstances where  courts not only enforced
a contract but  had made determinations as to whether a person was an African-American.  See, e.g., In
Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff’d 532 F. 2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1976)
(distinguishing on the basis that “Shelley v. Kraemer required the state court to find that the prospective
buyer was black . . .”); Noah, 9 P.3d at 870 (“In Shelley, the state action was more than mere judicial
enforcement.  The courts had to identify prospective African-American purchasers, determine the scope
of the racially restrictive covenants and enforce them against the African-Americans.”); see also Lebron
v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 392, rev’d on other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995) (Second
Circuit’s statement of state action doctrine reflects the understanding that race is treated differently under
the state action); see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, State Action, 618 PLI/Lit 183, 200 (1999) (noting that
“the Court has been much more likely to apply the exceptions in cases involving race discrimination than
in cases involving other constitutional claims”).  
Such differential treatment as between race and other constitutional values has been criticized
by some commentators.  See id. (“Yet, this distinction seems difficult to defend.  State action is about
whether the Constitution should apply because of the government’s involvement or because the act is one
that is traditionally governmental in nature.  It is unclear why this inquiry depends at all on the particulars
of the constitutional claim”).  The Supreme Court has not had an occasion to revisit the state action
fledged polities – should.  
With all due respect,  I believe this argument to be without merit.  Put
aside the fact that it is the American courts that have analyzed Un-American
Judgments that have invoked Shelley.  Never mind, as well, that Marsh is an
outlier that has been limited.129  Marsh is not the relevant precedent because the
company town in Marsh operated within the territorial boundaries of the
United States and in effect regulated citizens of the United States.  To the
extent the company town was akin to a polity, it accordingly stood in for an
American polity  when it sought to manage the solicitation of materials. The
same cannot be said for English defamation law and French hate speech law:
both regulations come from foreign countries, and the United States
Constitution cannot be said to apply to foreign countries under any intelligible
theory.130  
To quickly summarize, Shelley is anomalous. The overwhelming weight
of contemporary case law has held that judicial enforcement of legal rights does
not mean that those substantive legal rights are  attributable to the state under
the state action doctrine.131   Concerned that Shelley’s approach threatened to
dissolve the line between public and private action, the vast majority of courts
have limited Shelley to the context of racial discrimination.132  Finally, the recent
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doctrine in the context of race in recent years.  Perhaps our post-Shelley jurisprudence is best understood
as suggesting that racially restrictive covenants should be unenforceable on grounds of public policy rather
than the Constitution.  Other vehicles for disallowing enforcement are federal statute or state law.  
133The public/private distinction can be found in many places in contemporary law aside from the
doctrine of state action.   For example, it has appeared in equal protection jurisprudence, see Ball v. James,
451 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1981), free speech doctrine, see International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), and state constitutional law, see Parochiaid v. Engler, 566 N.W. 2d 208
(Mich. 1997); see generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1175, 1244 (1996) (“Of course, the public/private distinction, even if theoretically problematic in the way
that legal realists claim, is firmly rooted in constitutional jurisprudence.”).
134Early legal realist critiques include:  Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927)
(arguing that property rules are best understood as delegated public powers rather than private “rights”);
Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38  POL. SCI. QU. 470 (1923); Roscoe
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. J. 454 (1909); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for “State Action” Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1961).  More recent versions of the argument include Duncan Kennedy, The States of the Decline
of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner,
The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998);
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 242-68 (1987).
Supreme Court cases of  Cowles and Lugar are not to the contrary, for both lines
of cases find state action only in respect of legal rights that are created either
judicially or by the legislature. Where court activity does constitute state action
under these cases, all that is attributed to the state for purposes of
constitutional constraints is the activity arising from judicial or statutory
creation, not the underlying privately created legal rights that are being
enforced.
3.     Normative Considerations.  The analysis above shows that,
as a purely descriptive matter, the distinction between “private” activity not
reached by the constitution and “public” activity that is subject to
constitutional limitations is an important part of contemporary state action
doctrine.  Whether such distinctions between public and private133 are wise,
however, is another question. For generations, many legal scholars – most
notably, those associated with the schools of legal realism and critical legal
studies – have mounted arguments against the public/private distinction.134 This
section explains the shortcoming of critics’ arguments as applied to the state
action doctrine.   Contrary to the critics’ claims, the distinction is not illogical.
Instead, the distinction reflects cultural values.  Indeed, the longstanding
resilience of the public/private distinction despite generations of critique
suggests that the distinction reflects deeply grounded American cultural values,
which this section identifies.  The twin facts that the distinction is not illogical
and that it reflects deep American values together justify this Article’s
continued use of the public / private distinction.
(a)     The Classical Critique.  The core of the classical
critique is that “the state always plays a major role, implicitly or explicitly, in
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135Berman, Cultural Value, supra note 95, at 1279.  
136Id.
137See  Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of
Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 334 (1993). 
138Berman, supra note 95, at 1279.
139Kay, supra note 137, at 334-35.
140Berman, Cultural Value, supra note 95, at 1279.  All the essays referenced above make use of this critique
of the distinction between public and private.  See sources cited supra note 134.
141Id. at 1278.  Similar observations concerning the doctrine’s durability have been made by many others.
See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 134, at 1427 (noting that the distinction between public and private is “still
. . . alive and, if anything, growing in influence”).
142For such a suggestion, see Horwitz, supra note 134, at 1427; cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State
Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 504-5 (1985) (concluding that early scholars were “successful in
demonstrating the incoherence of the state action doctrine”).
any legal relationship.”135  This is because   “[a]ll private actions take place
against a background of laws.”1 3 6  For example, law affirmatively permits
activities or implicitly permits them by failing to prohibit them.137  Furthermore,
“individual choices are strongly influenced by the context of state-created
law.”1 3 8  “Explicit government actions on such things as fiscal and monetary
policy, licensing of occupations, zoning, and education, among many other
subjects, determine the environment in which individual decisions are made,
and determine, in significant degree, the costs and benefits of alternative
personal choices.”139  For these reasons, many have argued that it makes no
sense to even attempt to draw a line between public and private action.  Any
such attempt is inherently “incoherent.”140  I shall refer to this as the classical
critique of the public/private distinction.
(b)     Inadequacy of the Classical Critique.  Analysis of the
strength of the classical critique of the public/private distinction must begin
with the empirical observation that the distinction has “survive[d] both as a
matter of constitutional doctrine and popular intuition.”141  Is the durability of
the public/private distinction the regrettable result of courts having been deaf
to logic?142  I shall suggest otherwise: the distinction’s durability reflects an
aspect of American culture of which courts and legal analysts appropriately
ought to take account.
First, if we observe the logical end point of the classical critique, we see
that it virtually eliminates the realm of “private,” for practically no laws can be
said to be axiomatic; alternatives, or no regulation at all, almost always are
plausible.  The classical critique thus suggests that virtually all, if not all, activity
undertaken by a person under any legal regime is appropriately  attributed to
the state and hence is properly subjected to constitutional limitations.  That this
conclusion likely is startling to most people suggests that the classical critique
omits some relevant considerations. 
Indeed it does.  What the classical critique neglects can be identified by
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143Alternatively, the argument of critics of the public/private distinction can be understood to be that the
government agency component overwhelms individual agency so that it is appropriate to conclude that
there always is state action so long as there is some government agency.  If so, some argument must be
proffered as to why this is so.  I have not found it.  Moreover, one would expect that the conclusion of
whether individual agency or government agency predominates would vary from context to context.
Proponents of this version of the classical critique, however, do not appear to make context-specific
arguments, but instead typically conclude that there always is state action.   The absence of any such
argument suggests that this argument boils down to the claim that there is only government agency, and
any such assumption is incorrect for the reasons described above in text.
means of a two step argument.  First, all the classical critique establishes is that
there  always is state involvement – what I’ll call “government agency” – in
individuals’ decisionmaking.  That there always is some government agency is
only half the story, however, for it still may be meaningful to identify individual
agency.  There may be individual agency where the legal consequence of an
individual’s action is the result of the action’s interaction with the law.  This is
true even where the law that determines the action’s consequence could have
been different, and where the law is not the choice of the individual, but has
been imposed upon her.  To be sure, individuals under such circumstances
have constrained autonomy insofar as they operate subject to a non-axiomatic
set of rules that they have not chosen.   Nevertheless, individual agency surely
is present  when an individual’s action is deliberate and the person can predict
how her action will interact with the operative law to produce a result.
An analogy to the physical sciences might be useful to clarify this point.
Under current understandings, the laws of physics are not invariable but are
context dependent; one set of physical principles appears to govern physical
behavior at the atomic and sub-atomic levels (quantum mechanics) whereas
another set of laws (Newtonian mechanics) operates on larger systems.
Similarly, the gravitational force to which people are subject is greater on the
Earth than the Moon.  Most people would not conclude from this that a
person who behaved in a manner that (for example) predictably resulted in her
being propelled forward while on Earth did not act autonomously because the
physical laws that govern the consequences of her actions are only one among
at least two possible sets of laws.  Rather, we  typically attribute human agency
to the decision of a person to act in accordance with non-axiomatic physical
laws to which she is subject when the physical laws are known such that the
consequence of her action is readily predictable. 
Second, advocates of the classical critique typically believe that erasing
the distinction between public and private action ineluctably follows from the
understanding that government agency always is present.143  The critics’
conclusion, however, is based on a contestable jurisprudential position.  Their
conclusion rests on the premise that it is jurisprudentially unfounded as an a
priori matter to utilize a binary characterization scheme (e.g., one that asks:  is
it private or public?) when the object being categorized has elements of both.
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144This is not to deny that legal fictions should not deviate too much from the reality they attempt to
capture.  If they do, they likely will not function effectively and also might misinform people about the
nature of the world.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 550-51 (2000).
145Litigation is not the set of data to consult to check the extent to which there exists a shared culture.
Indeed, litigated cases are better described as records of  failed common understandings.  A better place
to look to check if the point made in text is valid  is to ask whether  lawyers generally are able to
understand what law instructs.  Though there always are ambiguities at the margins, the answer
unquestionably is yes, as is attested to by the everyday world of transactional lawyering in which attorneys
give advice to their clients and draft agreements on the basis of an understanding of what the law
instructs.
The critics assume that sharp legal categories are appropriate only when
working with “pure” objects that are readily fit into only one or the other
category.  
The critics’ underlying jurisprudence asks too much of law.  Our world
is complex, and seldom if ever is the reality that the law seeks to characterize
wholly pure in composition. At the same time, law by its nature is a social
institution that seeks to simplify decisionmaking and action-taking by
identifying as legally relevant only a handful of the infinite considerations that
characterize any given circumstance.  As a result of these two things – the
reductive nature of law and the complex character of life – there seldom if ever
are circumstances where a given legal category is coterminous with a pure
reality in the world.  Rather, reality is complex, and legal categories simplify
analysis by shoe-horning complex phenomena into simplified categories.
Doing so is bound to distort reality; that is, an item identified as “x” almost
always will also have some “non-x” characteristics.144 
This does not mean that all legal questions are “hard.”  What typically
makes a legal question “not hard” is not that a legal category corresponds to a
pure reality, but that  a given situation is most plausibly characterized one way
or the other.  What determines whether a given situation is “most plausibly
characterized” one way or the other is not logic but judgment.   The mere fact
that subjective judgment is involved, however, does not mean that the
judgment necessarily will be  controversial.  The judgment is a product of the
socially constructed intuitions, values, and ideology that constitutes a culture.
To the extent there is a rich and widely shared culture, it is to be expected that
there will be widespread agreement as regards many if not most judgments.145
 It is at this point that the endurance of the public/private distinction
becomes analytically relevant.  Because one always can locate an aspect of
government agency in respect of any activity that a person undertakes insofar
as some polity could have proscribed it, the approach taken by Shelley cannot
be said to be illogical.  As discussed above, however, it is equally true that one
meaningfully can speak of individual agency under circumstances where the
result of the action is a product of the non-axiomatic laws with which the
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146See Cultural Value, supra note 95, at 1268 (“Although the [argument that there is no coherent distinction
between public and private] may be correct, its appeal seems limited.  Indeed, not only have courts been
unmoved, but my guess is that most Americans are likely to resist, on an intuitive level, scholarly attempts
to erode the distinction between public and private.  Most of us like to believe that there are spheres of
privacy in which we exist, untouched by the state.  The argument that such private spheres are illusory,
and that our activities are inextricably bound up in the state, therefore, is unlikely to be persuasive.”); Kay,
supra note 137, at xx (trying to explain the durability of the public / private distinction notwithstanding
the “persuasive” critiques of the distinction that critics have provided).
147This would appear to be implicit in Professor Berman’s account insofar as he simultaneously states that
he finds the incoherence critique convincing, see Cultural Value, supra note 95, at 1279-80,  and  concludes
that most Americans are likely to resist scholarly attempts to erode the distinction between public and
private, see id. at 1268.
148To be sure, this conception of autonomy is not axiomatic.  Under Aristotelian and certain religion
approaches to personhood, for example, it is thought that appropriate constraints paradoxically increase
autonomy.  The notion is that limitations permit the development of virtue, which is the prerequisite to
true choice.  See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential Associations,
Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1066 & n. 50 (1998).  For purposes
of this Article, which concerns American culture, it is not problematic to utilize the American conception
of autonomy, even if it is not axiomatic. 
149See supra p. 18.
action interacts.  We thus are presented with a situation where there is an
admixture of government and individual agency. As shown above,  American
case law consistently has concluded that much of the time the component of
individual agency predominates.  This reflects not logical necessity, but
commonly held American political cultural values.
(c)     Cultural Values Behind the Distinction.  Accordingly,
the type of argument that critics of the public/private distinction must advance
is not one of logic but normativity: for instance, they must convince people
that a court’s enforcement of a contract is more plausibly construed as state
action than a vindication of private ordering.  I am skeptical that the critics can
succeed in convincing many people of this.  Several contemporary critics of the
public/private distinction agree that their arguments are not likely to sway the
masses, and that the public/private distinction is here to stay.146 With this I
agree. But to the extent these contemporary critics’ conclusions rest on the
belief that the distinction’s resilience reflects a lack of analytical clarity on the
part of the general public,147 I object.   Rather, the distinction’s durability reflects
values that are an important part of our country’s larger political culture.  
To see this, it is necessary to briefly identify the cultural values behind
the distinction.  Judicial opinions have identified three benefits.  The first
concerns autonomy: maintaining the  distinction retains a larger sphere for
individuals to order their lives as they so choose.148  To draw on the hypothetical
discussed above,149 the distinction between public and private allows the
principal of the private school to exercise viewpoint discrimination in
circumstances that a government could not.  Moreover, the expanded range of
options that a hard distinction between public and private makes available to
the principal has beneficial cascading effects.  The hard distinction allows for
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150For a comprehensive discussion of this point, see Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First
Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1537, 1617-
33 (1998).
151This is true at least with respect to contracts with booksellers that engaged in interstate commerce (and
accordingly could be regulated under the Commerce Clause).  Other booksellers perhaps could be
regulated by Congress pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment; Congress has the
power to proscribe activities that are not themselves unconstitutional if Congress’ regulation is congruent
and proportional to a possible constitutional violation.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33
(1997).  A plausible argument could be made that regulating bookseller contractual provisions touches
closely enough upon First Amendment concerns to satisfy this standard, though it is far from certain that
such an argument would succeed. 
152Of course, federalism concerns still would be implicated if a state court applied the Shelley analysis to
determine that enforcement of the provision were unconstitutional.  Under such circumstances, after all,
the state court merely would be applying federal constitutional law, which trumps competing state law
under the Supremacy Clause.  The fact it was a state  governmental actor that was required to apply
federal law accordingly would not reduce the threat to federalism concerns.
a broader array of societal institutions; in this case, the creation of schools that
create distinctive environments.  Parents accordingly have a richer cluster of
options among which they can choose, expanding their effective autonomy, as
well.  Indeed, in the First Amendment context in particular, erasing the
distinction between public and private threatens to impose an orthodoxy on
citizens by disallowing citizens to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint (in this
case, for instance, disallowing citizens from sending their children to a school
that expresses disdain for books that champion fascist ideas).  In this sense,
ignoring the distinction between public and private threatens to destroy what
many believe to be the core concern of the First Amendment, the protection
against a government-created orthodoxy.150 
The second and third standard reasons courts have proffered to justify
the distinction between public and private –  separation of powers and
federalism –  are institutional mechanisms for advancing the democratic ideal
of limiting the scope of judiciary so as to retain space for democratic politics.
In a jurisprudential world in which there are hearty federal constitutional
doctrines, the absence of a strong distinction between public and private would
dramatically increase the power of courts in relation both to the other branches
of the federal government (separation of powers) and the states (federalism).
Consider the hypothetical once again.  Under contemporary doctrine, the
principal is not constitutionally foreclosed from contracting with the bookseller
so as to keep certain materials from the school’s bookshelves.  States could
decide that such provisions are unenforceable as a matter of state contract, or
state constitutional, law.  Similarly, Congress could regulate some of these
materials if it wanted.151  The decision of whether to allow such contractual
provisions accordingly falls to either the States or Congress under
contemporary law.  Under a Shelley-type analysis, by contrast, the courts would
make the determination as a matter of federal constitutional law.152
To conclude, the critics of the public/private distinction bear the
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153Indeed, it is not unusual for a single term to have different meanings in different contexts.  See, e.g.,
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)(holding that “substantial nexus” means one thing in
the context of due process and something else in respect of the dormant commerce clause).
154See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (summarizing state action case law as “insist[ing] that the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State”).
burden not of pointing out flaws in reasoning, but of remaking critical aspects
of our country’s political culture. Popular opposition to erasing the
public/private distinction and making all contract claims (for example) subject
to constitutional limitations is not illogical, for both individual agency and state
agency are present in all contracts.  The widespread popular tendency to view
contracts as belonging to the “private” realm likely reflects deeply held
American cultural values that favor expanding individual autonomy and
preserving room for democratic politics by limiting the role of courts.  That the
public/private distinction is not illogical and that it reflects deeply held cultural
values are two strong justifications for this Article’s continued use of the
distinction.
C.    The Analogy Between Private Contracts and Foreign Countries’ Regulations.
The analysis above established that United States courts routinely have held
that the  enforcement of legal rights created via private contract does not
constitute state action.  The contemporary doctrine rejects the approach
adopted in Shelley and instead embraces a strong public/private distinction.
The question raised in the context of the enforcement of foreign judgments,
however, is somewhat different.  In those cases, the source of the legal right is
foreign law, not “private” contract.  This does not matter, however, for
purposes of the state action doctrine.  Here I intend to explain why foreign
public law should be treated analogously to private contract for purposes of the
state action doctrine.
To be sure, this position at first may sound wildly inconsistent.  After
all, I have identified and defended a hard public/private distinction in one
corner of state action doctrine (i.e., the enforcement of domestic contracts
should be deemed to be purely private action) and now advocate abandoning
the  public/private distinction in another (enforcement of foreign courts’
judgments).   
A careful consideration of the state action doctrine, however, discloses
why this disparate treatment is warranted.153  The state action doctrine is a
method for determining if an American polity has acted in  such a manner that
the Constitution properly is applied to it.154   In determining whether and to
what extent a court’s activity qualifies as state action, all that matters is whether
an American polity is the origin of the legal right.   If so, then there is state
action to the extent that the American court is acting pursuant to the direction
given it by an American polity.  However, if the American court is acting
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155Indeed, a strong argument can be made that an American court’s enforcement of a domestic contract
implicates state action concerns more than does enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment.  The law of
contract could be said itself to qualify as state action insofar as state-made law determines which contracts
are enforceable and which are not.  Recognizing foreign judgments can fairly be characterized as reflecting
less of an American polity’s sanction of the substantive content of the legal claims insofar as principles
of international cooperation motivate the recognition of foreign judgments.  It accordingly could be
argued that  because American courts by and large do not treat the enforcement of domestic contracts
as state action, it follows a fortiori that enforcement of foreign judgments also should not qualify as state
action.
156See supra at 18.
157This hypothetical, as well as the subsequent two, concern judicial application of law rather than the
enforcement of judgments.  Making use of laws simplifies the hypotheticals’ fact patterns, but does not
undermine their lesson.  This is so because there is no reason to believe that enforcing judgments
implicates state action any more than does application of law. 
158See supra note 157.
pursuant to legal rights not created by an American polity, it should not matter
for purposes of today’s post-Shelley world of state action doctrine what the
precise source of those legal rights are.  Whether they are contractual rights
negotiated by individuals or regulations imposed by a foreign country upon a
consenting individual, there can be no attribution of it to the United States
court under contemporary state action doctrine because the right’s source is
not an American polity.155
The equivalence for purposes of the act of state doctrine of private
contracts and foreign regulations can be illustrated by considering three
hypothetical cases.  Hypothetical A is the purely domestic case (discussed
above156) in which a New York bookseller and a private school principal in New
York enter into a contract that contains a material provision stating that
“Bookseller shall not ship Nazi materials to the private school.” Although an
American court’s enforcement of such a provision would qualify as state action
under a strict reading of Shelley, a contemporary court would not rule that
enforcing such a contractual provision implicates the First Amendment,
notwithstanding the fact that New York could not have enacted the contractual
provision into general law.157  In short, this first hypothetical is a paradigm of
the private ordering that the post-Shelley case law shields from constitutional
scrutiny. 
Consider next Hypothetical B, which involves an international setting
in which contract once again is the source of the legal right.158  Imagine a New
York bookseller and a private school principal in Holland.  A material
provision in their contract reads exactly as the provision above, that the
“Bookseller shall not ship Nazi materials to the private school.”  If enforcing
the purely domestic contract in hypothetical A does not qualify as state action
– and it does not – it is difficult to see why enforcing Hypothetical B’s contract
would constitute state action.   This is sensible, for the foreign identity of the
purchaser surely has no bearing on the question of whether the New York
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159To simplify matters, I assume for present purposes that a New York court had personal jurisdiction
over the Dutch principal and that the contractual provision would be enforceable under Dutch law. These
considerations have no bearing on the state action analysis, though they would complicate other aspects
of the legal analysis.  
160I specify a non-criminal foreign law because there is a well-established doctrine under which one
sovereign will not enforce foreign criminal judgments.  See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66,
123 (1825).  For a critique of this doctrine, see Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and
Government Judgments, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1932). 
161See supra note 157.
162Cf. John Hancock Mut. Life Insur. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)(holding that New York statute
providing that false statement in insurance application regarding medical treatment constitutes material
misrepresentation voiding policy is “a term of the contract” and must be applied by Georgia court).
163See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (summarizing state action case law as “insist[ing] that the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State”).
164This is not to suggest that the Constitution never could be relevant.  For instance, the categorical refusal
to enforce judgments from certain foreign countries could violate equal protection challenge if courts
lacked a rational basis for doing so.  This is not a resurrection of the rule of Shelley, for the court’s action
would constitute state action because it reflected a governmental rule that foreign judgments not be
enforced.   Any such constitutional challenge, however, would have nothing to do with the substance of
court’s enforcement of the contract constitutes state action.  In short, for
purposes of the New York court’s state action analysis, the international
dimension of this second hypothetical is wholly irrelevant.159  
Our last case, Hypothetical C, concerns an international setting in
which foreign law is the source of the legal right.  Imagine that the same New
York bookseller and a  principal of a French school have a contract for the
delivery of books.  Imagine further that a French noncriminal law160 provides
that “booksellers shall not ship Nazi materials to French schools,” and that the
law provides a civil remedy for  noncompliance.  The question is whether, for
state action purposes, an American court’s enforcement of this French law161 is
meaningfully different from a court’s enforcement of the contract with the
Dutch principal in Hypothetical B. 
I do not see why it should be. To begin, the French regulation readily
can be conceptualized as a mandatory contractual term imposed by the French
government,162 thereby narrowing the gap between Hypotheticals B and C.
Even if one were to resist this argument, however, the conclusion that there is
no meaningful distinction between the two hypotheticals would not change. 
The fact that the source of the legal right sued upon in Hypothetical C is a
French regulation rather than a contract entered into with the Dutch person in
Hypothetical B is of no  relevance to post-Shelley state action doctrine.    The
doctrine is concerned with identifying when a branch of the American
government acts in such a manner that constitutional limitations appropriately
are applied to it.163 What matters under current doctrine is whether the law
motivating a court’s actions comes from an American polity.  If it does not –
as is true in all three hypotheticals – then there is no state action.  So long as
the source is not an American polity, the precise source of the legal
requirement simply is not relevant to contemporary state action analysis.164
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the legal rights that are encapsulated in the judgment, and accordingly is unrelated to the question of
whether Un-American judgments can be constitutionally enforced.
165Van Houweling, The Next Yahoo!, supra note 8, at 703-04.
166Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 (1996).  
167The propriety of the conclusion that constitutional scrutiny is warranted would turn on whether
enforcing the Un-American Judgment at issue would impose a “significant” effect on speech.
IV.     INCIDENTAL EFFECTS OF A GENERAL RULE TO ENFORCE FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS
The courts that have refused to enforce Un-American Judgments on
the theory that doing so would be unconstitutional have relied on the state
action analysis that this Article critiqued above in Part III.  A different
approach to ground the conclusion that enforcing Un-American Judgments
implicates constitutional  questions  recently has been advanced in the scholarly
literature, though as yet it has not been relied on by any court.  The contention
is that the rule “enforce foreign judgments” is a “generally applicable rule” that
triggers constitutional scrutiny if it has a “significant negative effect” on
speech.1 65  The logic presumably would generalize to include enforcement of
Un-American Judgments that had significant effects on other fundamental
rights, as well.166  I will call this the “incidental effects of enforcement”
approach (or “IEE” for short).  
IEE might appear at first to circumvent the obstacles confronting state
action analysis insofar as it locates an actual governmental rule – the rule of
“enforce foreign judgments.”  This Part IV shows, however, that although
generally applicable rules sometimes can trigger First Amendment scrutiny, this
is true only of rules of a type that would not include a rule that courts are to
enforce foreign judgments.  I will argue here that IEE would require a
problematic expansion of the current doctrine that would reproduce many of
the problems found in the courts’s state action analysis that was critiqued in
Part III.  Most prominently, IEE risks erasing the public/private distinction.
A.     Current Doctrine.  
1.     Black Letter Law.  The question for present purposes is
whether a rule of general application that nonetheless imposes a significant
effect on speech might trigger constitutional scrutiny.  If it can, and if “enforce
foreign judgments” is such a general rule, then the American courts’
determinations that the enforcement of Un-American Judgments raises
constitutional questions is not per se incorrect.167  If, on the other hand, “enforce
foreign judgments” is not the type of general rule with respect to which even
significant speech effects can trigger constitutional scrutiny, then the
conclusion remains that enforcement of Un-American Judgments does not
raise constitutional concerns.
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168391 U.S. 367 (1968).
169Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 105 (1987).
170See Incidental Burdens, supra note 165, at 1202.
171472 U.S. 675 (1985).
172To be sure, the constitutional review applied in both O’Brien and Albertini was highly deferential.  See
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 110-111.  What is relevant for present purposes,
however, is whether the Court applies any constitutional scrutiny to generally applicable laws, not what
level  of scrutiny is applied.
173472 U.S. at 678.
174Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications,
26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 784 (1985); see Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (“every civil
and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First Amendment protected activities.”); Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 105 (noting that the “number of laws” that “have an
incidental effect of free speech . . . is virtually limitless.”).
175Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 105; see also Glickman v. Wileman Brothers &
Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470 (1997) (“The First Amendment has never been construed to require
heightened scrutiny of any financial burden that has the incidental effect of constraining the size of a
firm’s advertising budget.  The fact that an economic regulation may indirectly lead to a reduction in a
handler’s individual advertising budget does not itself amount to a restriction on speech.”).
176Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 165, at 1199.
To begin, as a purely descriptive matter, “general” laws that incidentally
burden speech sometimes generate constitutional scrutiny.  In United States v.
O’Brien,168 for instance, the Court applied the First Amendment to a federal
statute that prohibited the knowing destruction or mutilation of draft cards.
The law was “general” insofar as it was not aimed at expression; it not only was
content-neutral, but it “expressly restrict[ed a] noncommunicative activit[y].”169
It nonetheless had an incidental effect on speech insofar as defendant O’Brien
had burned his draft card as a communicative act of political speech.1 7 0  In
United States v. Albertini,171 the Court applied First Amendment review to a
federal statute that prohibited any person from entering a military base after
being ordered not to by a commanding officer.172  The federal statute once again
was general, but it had incidental speech effects when applied to a person who
entered a military base for the purpose of criticizing the nuclear arms race.173
As commentators have recognized, the major doctrinal challenge with
regard to constitutionalizing incidental burdens is identifying the appropriate
stopping point.  The problem is that “[v]irtually every government decision is
likely to have some incidental effect on some constitutionally protected
value.”174  In the context of speech, for example, consider “environmental and
minimum wage laws that raise the price of newspapers, thus dampening public
debate; laws that convert public parks to parking lots, thus eliminating public
forums, and laws that tax income, thus reducing the amount of money
individuals have to spend on expressive activities.”175  Subjecting all laws that
impose incidental burdens to either strict or heightened review accordingly
“would jeopardize government’s ability to function, because [it] would require
judicial scrutiny, if not judicial invalidation, of nearly all government
regulation.”176
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177See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983)
(“Clearly, the First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press.  It is beyond dispute that the
States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations
without creating constitutional problems.”).
178See id. (citing to xx).
179See Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 165, at xx.
180Such regulations “must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve
a significant government interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication.”  Forsynth
County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).  Frederick Schauer was one of the first to note
that the public forum doctrine is an exception to the general rule regarding incidental burdens to speech.
See Schauer, Cuban Cigars, supra note 173, at 789.
181478 U.S. 697 (1986).
182Id. at 705.
183See id. at 707.
As a matter of positive law, general laws that create incidental effects
on fundamental rights typically will not trigger constitutional scrutiny.177 For
instance, despite incidental effects on speech, no constitutional review is
occasioned by application to the press of the antitrust laws, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, or  the National Labor Relations Act.178   (Because incidental
burdens are most likely to lead to constitutional review when speech is at
issue,179 the analysis that follows focuses on incidental burdens on speech. If
IEE is unavailing with regard to incidental effects on speech, as I show below,
then a fortiori it will not trigger constitutional review for incidental burdens on
non-speech fundamental rights.) There is one broad exception to the rule  that
incidental speech effects do not lead to constitutional scrutiny, and two narrow
exceptions.  The broad exception is the public forum; content-neutral time,
place and manner regulations of traditional public fora are subject to relatively
strict constitutional scrutiny.180  The precise contours of the public forum
doctrine need not concern us here, however, because a foreign country patently
would not qualify as a public forum. 
Outside of a public forum, general regulations that generate incidental
burdens on speech will trigger constitutional review under the narrow
circumstances that are discussed in the leading case of Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc..181 At issue in Cloud Books was a New York statute authorizing closure of
buildings found to be a public health nuisance on account of their being places
of prostitution or lewdness.  This general statute was used to close down a
bookstore that sold sexually explicit, non-obscene materials.  Such materials are
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment, and it was argued that
closure of the store burdened the constitutionally protected bookselling
activity.182
The Court held that constitutional scrutiny was unwarranted.183  The
Court cited the stopping point concern – the argument that constitutional
review is appropriate due to the speech effects “proves too much since every
civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First
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184Id. at 706.
185Id.
186Id. (citing to Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)).
187Id. at 706.
188Id. at 706 & n. 3.
189Id. 
190Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 165, at 1206.
191Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 114.
192Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 112 (emphasis supplied).
Amendment protected activities”184 – and identified two limited circumstances
where general statutes will receive constitutional review.   The first is “where
a statute has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive
activity,”185 such as the tax on the sale of large quantities of newsprint and ink
that was struck down in Minneapolis Star.186  The second is “where it was conduct
with a significant expressive element that drew the legal remedy in the first
place.”187  The Court explained that this second category refers to statutes that
regulate “nonspeech” conduct that is “intimately related to expressive conduct
protected under the First Amendment.”188  For instance, the nonspeech conduct
of burning a draft card was inseparable from the defendant’s political speech
in O’Brien.  By contrast, the activities that “drew sanction”189 in Cloud Books –
prostitution and lewd behavior – “were not communicative, even from the
private actor’s perspective.”190  
The rule “enforce foreign judgments” would not trigger constitutional
scrutiny under the test announced in Cloud Books.  Because such an
enforcement rule is generally applicable and content-neutral, “the general
presumption” would apply that “that incidental restrictions do not raise a
question of first amendment review.”191 This presumption would not be
rebutted by either of the exceptions identified in Cloud Books.  With regard to
the first, the rule does not have disproportionate application to expressive
activity, but applies to foreign judgments based on foreign laws that govern the
full range of behavior that foreign governments regulate. Cloud Books’ second
exception would not be applicable because, as a procedural judicial rule, the
enforcement rule does not regulate any primary conduct whatsoever.  As such,
the rule cannot, and does not, regulate any expressive activity that is
intertwined with nonspeech activity.  The enforcement rule only has potential
effects on speech, and effects alone are insufficient under Cloud Books to trigger
constitutional scrutiny.
2.     The Doctrine in Practice?.  In an influential article,
however, Professor Geoffrey Stone argued that  the Cloud Books formulation
does not accurately characterize the case law.  Rather, Stone argues, “the Court
will undertake first amendment review when an incidental restriction has a
significant effect on free expression.”192  Similarly, Professor Michael Dorf argues
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193See Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 165, at 1180 (“In the course of describing the current doctrine
governing incidental burdens in the free speech, free exercise, and rights to privacy contexts, I identify a
substantiality threshold in each of these areas.”); id. at 1201 (citing to Professor Stone’s article for the
proposition that constitutional scrutiny is triggered “whenever the challenged restriction significantly limits
the opportunities for free expression”).  Professor Dorf argues at length that a substantiality threshold is
normatively desirable, see id. at 1202-1210, but he does not appear to offer any argument that
contemporary doctrine already incorporates a substantiality threshold apart from reliance on Professor
Stone’s analysis.  See id.
194The refinement I propose is similar to the way Professor Dorf’s understanding of “substantiality.”  My
conclusion accordingly is consistent with Professor Dorf’s analysis.
195See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 110-14.   The three cases are: Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); and Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).  
Professor Stone looked to another pre-Cloud Books case, United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S.
675 (1985), to support the proposition that either the two exceptions in Cloud Books are nonexhaustive
or that “in at least some cases ‘expressive’ activity is defined quite broadly.”  Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, supra note 168, at 110.  In that case, the Court applied constitutional scrutiny to a federal
statute that prohibited persons ordered not to enter a military base from doing so as  applied to a protester
against nuclear proliferation.  The majority in Cloud Books justified constitutional review in Albertini on
the ground that there was “governmental regulation of conduct that ha[d] an expressive element.” Cloud
Books, 478 U.S. at 703-04.  Stone asks “was it the expressive leafleting or the nonexpressive reentry that
‘drew the legal remedy?”and concludes that “Albertini suggests either an expansion of the Cloud Books
exceptions or at least a very broad definition of ‘expressive’ activity.”  Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,
supra note 168, at 110.  
I agree that it is difficult to characterize the activity proscribed in Albertini as “expressive,” for
the defendant “was prosecuted not for demonstrating . . . but for reentering the base after he had been
ordered not to do so,”and the order was due to the defendant’s prior acts of vandalism on the military
base.  Albertini, 472 U.S. at 686.  However, pace Professor Stone, it seems to me that it is difficult to
characterize the pre-Cloud Books case of Albertini as an “expansion” of Cloud Books. It seems to me that
the Cloud Books majority recast Albertini as an expressive conduct case by judicial fiat, perhaps because
Cloud Books was reluctant to question the Albertini case, which had been decided only a year earlier and
authored by just-retired Chief Justice Burger.  To my mind, Albertini was wrong to subject the statute to
any constitutional scrutiny whatsoever because the statute did not satisfy the two criteria identified by the
Court a year later in Cloud Books.  Regardless, shoehorning Albertini into “expressive conduct” is better
understood as a narrowing of Albertini rather than an expansion of the category of expressive conduct.
196See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 110-14.
on both positive and normative grounds that constitutional scrutiny is triggered
when an incidental burden is “substantial.”193  This subsection takes issue with
Stone’s and Dorf’s positive accounts, arguing that Cloud Books’ formulation, or
at most a more modest refinement than Professors Stone and Dorf proffer, is
the best statement of the rule as regards incidental burdens on speech and
shows that the rule “enforce foreign judgments” would not trigger
constitutional scrutiny on this modified understanding of Cloud Books.194
Professor Stone’s positive claim rests on three cases.195  Importantly, all
were decided before Cloud Books.  Stone relies on these cases to support the
proposition that the Cloud Books rule does not accurately describe the doctrine
as a purely positive matter.196  It is puzzling that his analysis, which purports to
be positive in nature, does not consider that these cases were limited to the
extent they are inconsistent with the rule announced in the later case of Cloud
Books.  
In any event, it seems to me that Professor Stone’s analysis overstates
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197468 U.S. 609 (1984.
198 Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 112.
199Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
200457 U.S. 596 (1982).
201Id. at 604.  Indeed, the opinion is fairly characterized as an extended discourse on the importance of
“the First amendment right of access to criminal trials” as a matter of “both logic and experience.” Id.
at 606; see generally id. at 604-06 (right of access to criminal trials is a means of “assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government,” “plays a particularly significant
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole,” “enhances the quality and
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process,” “fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening
public respect for the judicial process, “permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the
judicial process – an essential component in our structure of self-government.”).  If one wanted to suggest
that access to criminal trials itself is not a constitutional right, the factors discussed in Globe Newspapers
would equally support treating the criminal trial as a special forum that merits constitutional scrutiny even
for general regulations, just as is the case with public forums.  Indeed, that, in my view, is the best way
of understanding the opinion.  Relatedly, it seems to me that the state statute should have been subject
to less than strict scrutiny.   
202See id. at 607.  This is not to suggest that I believe that strict scrutiny was appropriate.  See supra note
200.
203See Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 165, at 1202-04 (noting that O’Brien scrutiny applies when
general statutes imposing incidental burdens trigger constitutional scrutiny).
the inconsistencies.  Two cases appear to be fully compatible with the Court’s
approach in Cloud Books. Professor Stone argues that the case of Roberts v.
United States Jaycees197 did not “clearly involve a situation in which expressive
activity ‘drew the legal remedy’” and hence does not readily fit Cloud Books’
second exception.198  Roberts concerned constitutionally protected associational
rather than expressive activity, however, and the Court in that case explicitly
held that a “regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire” directly trenches on the “freedom of association, [which] plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate.”199  The Roberts case accordingly falls
within Cloud Books’s second exception because the regulated non-expressive
activity of whom to accept into the association was “intimately related” to the
protected First Amendment right of association.
In the second case relied on by Professor Stone,  Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court,200 the Court applied constitutional scrutiny to a state law that
required judges, at trials for specified sexual offenses involving victims under
the age of 18, to exclude the press and general public from the courtroom
during the victim’s testimony.  The Court  did not describe the state law as a
“general” regulation that imposed incidental effects on constitutional rights
but, to the contrary, treated the statute as directly trenching on “the First
amendment right of access to criminal trials.”201  Accordingly, the state statute
directly regulated the constitutionally protected conduct of attending criminal
trials.  For this reason, Globe Newspapers does not even fit the paradigm of a
general statute imposing an incidental burden, but is an example of a direct
regulation of a protected First Amendment right.  This helps explain why the
Court applied strict scrutiny,202 not the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny that
typically applies when incidental burdens trigger constitutional scrutiny.203 
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204357 U.S. 449 (1958).
205This approach runs into the difficulty that NAACP’s constitutional holding continues to be approvingly
referred to by the Court.  See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990).
206Another possibility, of course, is to conclude that rule of law commitments demand no constitutional
scrutiny in NAACP, notwithstanding a desire to do so, due to an inability to generate a principled and
administrable distinction that would keep the floodgates to constitutional review of all incidental burdens
closed.  I myself believe, however, that a principled and administrable distinction can be located, as
discussed below in text.
207Although Professor Stone purports to be engaging in positive analysis when he proposes the significant
effects test, see Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 168, at 114, the discussion above
demonstrates, I think, that all cases he relies upon except NAACP are better understood differently.
Professor Stone’s analysis accordingly is best understood as an effort to generate a principle for explaining
why constitutional scrutiny was warranted in NAACP.
208Cf. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
The remaining case is best understood as standing for a principle
importantly narrower than the proposition that “significant” effects trigger
constitutional review.  The Court in NAACP v. Alabama2 0 4 subjected to
constitutional scrutiny a general state law, as applied to the NAACP, that
required foreign corporations seeking to do business in Alabama to provide the
state with the names and addresses of its members.  The case thus applied
constitutional scrutiny to a general law that does not fit either of the two
exceptions identified in Cloud Books: the law did not single out expression
(indeed, the brunt of its burden falls on non-expressive activity) and the
regulated conduct of submitting membership lists was not intimately related to
the constitutionally protected conduct of associating.  
So how should NAACP  be understood?  There are several
possibilities. Because NAACP v. Alabama preceded Cloud Books, the approach
NAACP used could be said to have been rejected by Cloud Books.205  Those like
myself who believe that constitutional review is normatively appropriate in
such circumstances will try206 to find a principled basis for permitting
constitutional review in NAACP but no review in the run-of-the-mill case
where general governmental regulations incidentally burden constitutional
rights. Professor Stone’s suggestions that the dividing line is whether the
regulation imposes “significant” effects  is one such effort.207  Such a
formulation does not adequately capture what made constitutional review
appropriate in NAACP, however, and accordingly provides inadequate
guidance, risking excessive constitutional review of incidental burdens.  The
salient factor justifying constitutional review is that the general law threatened
not just to impose “significant” effects, but to lead to an absolute deprivation
of the underlying right.208   This was the principal rationale that the NAACP
offered for its holding: the Court specifically found that forced disclosure of
membership could be expected to discourage people from joining the
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209See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-63 (“Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past
occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.
Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama
membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective
effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members
to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their
beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.”).
210Id. at 462 (emphasis supplied).
211See supra note 192 (suggesting that Professor Dorf’s analysis of incidental burdens on speech is best
understood in normative rather than positive terms).
212Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 165, at 1209.  I would apply this exception more narrowly than
Professor Dorf does with regard to speech.  For instance, I do not agree that the Court’s approach in
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), “sanctioned severe incidental
burdens.”  Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 165, at 1209.  It seems to me that those who wished to
protest governmental policies with respect to the homeless had ample alternatives apart from sleeping in
a public park across from the White House to make their point.
213See Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
214See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-63.
organization209 and for that reason concluded that “[i]nviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation
of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs.”210
This approach works nicely with Professor Dorf’s specification of  the
conditions that justify constitutional review of where general regulations
impose incidental burdens.211  He argues that “only those incidental burdens
that do not leave open adequate alternative channels of communication should
be subject to heightened scrutiny.”212 Carried over to the context of association,
the concern justifying constitutional scrutiny in NAACP is that regulations that
hinder the joining of associations do not leave open adequate opportunities for
association.  More so than speech, association is dependent upon quantity.  For
instance, whereas there were ample alternative communication channels that
were open to those who were prevented from sleeping in Lafayette Park to
protest governmental policies as regards the homeless,213 membership in a
group whose size is depressed due to governmental policies is not an adequate
alternative to membership in the larger group that would obtain in the absence
of governmental regulation.  This is because many of the essential attributes of
association  – the sociological experience of being part of a group, the group’s
ability to advocate and effectuate social and political change,214 the group
dynamics as regards stability and change over time, and so forth – are a
function of the size of the group.
To conclude, what emerges from the pre-Cloud Books case law that
Professor Stone’s analysis brings to light either is a modest adjustment of the
Cloud Books rule (via NAACP) or NAACP’s rejection in Cloud Books.  I, for
one, favor inclusion of the NAACP modification, under which a general law
will trigger constitutional scrutiny when its incidental effects threaten an
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215The general statutes that have triggered First Amendment review have fallen under Cloud Books’
second exception, where the regulated nonspeech conduct is intimately related to constitutionally
protected speech.  See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000) (applying
constitutional scrutiny to public accommodation law that regulated conduct protected by First
Amendment of not associating with those that an expressive association chooses not to associate with;
the “right to associate with others . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate” and is directly
burdened by a “regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire”); Watchtower Bible
and Trace Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 155 (2002)(constitutional
scrutiny to ordinance prohibiting “canvassers” from “going in and upon” private residential property for
the purpose of promoting any “cause” without first having obtained a permit); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. 277, 289(2000) (ordinance banning nudity in public places applied to activity of nude dancing,
which Court held to constitute constitutionally protected “expressive conduct”); cf. BE & K Construction
Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 525 (2002)(constitutional scrutiny to question of whether the National Labor
Relations Act’s prohibition of employers from restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees’
exercise of rights related to self-organization and collective bargaining could be used to impose liability
on employers for filing a lawsuit because “[t]he right of access to the courts is . . . but one aspect of the
right to petition”).
216See supra Part IV.A.1.
217I acknowledge that there still remains considerable “play” in determining the level at which the activity
is pitched for purposes of determining whether or not an absolute deprivation is threatened.  To elaborate
on the hypothetical provided above in text, is the relevant activity “selling adult books,” “selling books,”
or “speech”?  Only the first formulation would trigger constitutional scrutiny of the statute under my
reading of NAACP.  Of course, similar characterization uncertainties are involved in formulating
fundamental rights.  See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (confronting question
absolute deprivation of the constitutionally protected right.  The case law after
Cloud Books, however, does not clarify which is the correct state of the law.
Though the case law is consistent with the Cloud Books formulation without the
adjustment,215 a fact pattern that would test whether the Court would opt for
the modification has not been presented.  
In any event, the rule “enforce foreign judgments” would not trigger
constitutional scrutiny under either the adjusted or unadjusted Cloud Books
formulation.  I demonstrated the latter above.216  IEE would not merit
constitutional scrutiny under the adjusted Cloud Books test, either, for two
reasons.  First, incidental effects of enforcement, as burdensome as they might
be, almost never will threaten an absolute deprivation of the underlying right.
Cloud Books teaches that the fact that a general rule’s application might mean
that a particular person or entity will be unable to engage in constitutionally
protected speech does not constitute an absolute deprivation for present
purposes;  the fact that constitutionally protected books were not going to be
sold by  bookseller Cloud Books, whose shop was ordered closed, did not
trigger constitutional scrutiny.  As a matter of black letter law, the  absolution
deprivation  exception suggested by NAACP is narrow in scope, and the
activity that is the subject of the question “Would there be an absolute
deprivation?” is not defined molecularly at the level of the individual  (e.g., “Will
Cloud Books be able to continue selling its constitutionally protected
materials?)  but instead is defined in terms of the activity.    Thus a general and
neutral statute that had the incidental effect of closing down all adult
bookshops would appropriately trigger constitutional scrutiny.217  
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whether the privacy right is to be conceptualized as protecting “basic and intimate exercises of personal
autonomy” or “the right to die”).  My proposal thus shares the doctrinal indeterminacy that characterizes
other constitutional doctrines.  It seems highly unlikely that there is some principled way of formally fixing
the level of generality of the analyzed activity, but that the formulation inevitably is a product of the legal
decisionmaker’s good judgment.  I do not take this to be a generic argument against the utility of these
types of constitutional rules – indeed, indeterminacies with regard to fixing the level of generality is
endemic to the task of identifying the scope of a holding, one of the core components of common law
reasoning – but, rather, an acknowledgment of the limits of formalism.  Particularly in constitutional
decisionmaking, discretion is never wholly banished, and judgment almost always plays a role. 
218Although it could be claimed that even closure of the Internet would not effect a wholesale deprivation
insofar as alternative channels of communication would remain, cf. supra note 216, the better view, it
seems to me, is that the Internet is best understood as a discrete form of communication whose absolute
deprivation would raise constitutional concerns.
219To say that a constitutional issue is raised is not to indicate how it should be resolved, of course.  If
there were not effective and affordable filtering technology, the Internet in its current form might be
maintainable only if Un-American judgments in connection with the Internet were systematically not
enforced.  Not enforcing a foreign judgment means disregarding the foreign country’s distinctive policy
(for instance, England’s pro-plaintiff defamation law).  Does the United States Constitution categorically
mandate the overriding of foreign country’s interests in this fashion?  Does it effectively provide a United
States with worldwide immunity from foreign regulations that do not comport with American
constitutional requirements?  Does the Constitution export its political values in this manner?  If the
constitutional right were anything less than categorical – as virtually all constitutional rights are – then any
of these countervailing considerations conceivably could constitute a compelling governmental interest
to justify the enforcement of (at least some) Un-American Judgments, even under a constitutional analysis.
220See filtering articles.
As applied to the rule “enforce foreign judgments,” it is difficult to
conceive a foreign judgment whose enforcement would threaten absolute
deprivation of the underlying right.  Even if a particularly publisher were
unable to stay in business if it were obligated to either cease distribution abroad
or to print a special foreign edition that complied with foreign laws,
constitutional scrutiny would not be warranted because the complete loss of
one source of speech does not meet the Cloud Books criteria; the fact that the
book store in that case had to cease operation did not generate constitutional
review.   Yahoo! presents the closest case.  Imagine that enforcement of the
French judgment literally threatened to close down operation of the Internet.
Would enforcement then generate a constitutional question?  Yes, it seems to
me,218 but only under such a circumstance.  Technology would thus be a
threshold question to determine whether a constitutional issue would be raised
by enforcing such a foreign judgment.219  Once it were determined that
technology permits geographical filtering on the Internet – as it apparently
does, such that French users would not have access to sites that would be
available to British and American users220 –  the constitutional question would
fall away.  
  Second, a condition precedent of the adjusted rule may be absent.
Professor Dorf’s helpful formulation focuses attention on the question of
whether there are adequate alternative avenues of communication to the speech
that has been incidentally burdened.  Implicit in this is that the burdened
speech itself must be constitutionally protected.  This is sensible, for  incidental
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221See Van Houweling, The Next Yahoo!, supra note 8, at 713 (noting this); see generally Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957);  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
222This might not be the case if regulation of the American citizen’s out-of-country speech threatened to
absolutely undermine her domestic speech, as in the Yahoo! hypothetical discussed immediately above.
223See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY yy (2000).
224Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1998).
225Matthew Adler, the strongest proponent of the rights as “rights against rules” thesis, acknowledges this.
See Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor
Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1374-75 (2000).
226Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 222, at xx.
227See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1321, 1325 (2000); Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 222, at (agreeing that “rights as rights against rules
is a plausible first-order approximation of much Supreme Court doctrine”).
228See Johynson v. Texas, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
229Matthew D. Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence: Can the Two Coexist?, 6 LEGAL THEORY 337, 344
(2000).
interference with non-protected speech (such as obscene materials)  certainly
would not raise any constitutional questions.  This raises the following
question: is speech outside of the United States constitutionally protected?
This is a question that the Supreme Court has not yet answered.221  If the
answer is no, however, then the adjusted rule’s threshold requirement would
not be satisfied such that incidental burdens on such extraterritorial speech
could not trigger constitutional scrutiny.222  
Whether foreign speech is constitutionally protected may partly turn on
a hotly disputed jurisprudential question concerning the nature of
constitutional rights. The contested issue is whether constitutional rights
guarantee that certain privileged conduct can occur223 (“rights, simpliciter”) or
whether constitutional rights are “shields against particular [governmental]
rules”224 (“rights against rules”).   As a matter of positive law, all participants in
the debate agree that some rights are rights, simpliciter.225  For instance, the
Constitution’s ban on slavery is a “right[] not to have certain states of the world
exist rather than [a ] right[] not to be judged by certain kinds of rules.”226  As a
matter of positive law, all participants likewise agree that some rights are rights
against rules.227  For instance, while the government may not proscribe the
“desecrat[ion] [of a] . . . state or national flag,”228 the identical flag burning
activity can be prohibited “pursuant to a rule against arson, assault, the
destruction of government property, pollution, or some other such rule that
was not targeted at speech.”229  The Constitution thus does not guarantee a state
of the world in which a person can burn an American flag,  only that the
proscription not assume a form that singles out that the expressive activity of
flag-burning (right-against-rule).   Burning a flag hence is not a right, simpliciter.
 The disputants in the jurisprudential debate disagree as to whether
speech rights (and other fundamental rights) are best characterized as rights
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230Compare Adler, Response, supra note 224, at 1374 (arguing that free speech doctrine is characterized as
fitting the structure of a right-against-rules) with Fallon, As-Applied Challenges, supra note 226, at 1365
(arguing that constitutional rights, including free speech, “can be violated without a rule being centrally
involved” as a positive matter) and Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 222, at xx (xx).
231See Van Houweling, The Next Yahoo!, supra note 8, at 714-15 (making this argument).
232Subject to the limitations imposed by international human rights law, that is.
233For discussion of the scope of a country’s extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, see DIETER LANGE
AND GARY BORN, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS 35-40(1987); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402-04 (1987).
234See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (concurrences of Frankfurter, Harlan).
235As a matter of black letter law, this best characterizes the grand jury and jury guarantees that are
provided by Article III, §2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  See id.
simpliciter or rights-against-rules.230  If constitutionally protected speech rights are
rights simpliciter that guarantee particular “states of the world,” then these rights
patently do not apply outside the United States, as a purely descriptive matter.
For example, an American citizen’s speech in Saudi Arabia can be proscribed
by the Saudi Arabian government, even where the Kingdom cannot show a
compelling governmental interest or that there are alternative means by which
the American citizen’s communication can be made.  Even if the American
citizen’s speech in Saudi Arabia  would produce benefits in the United States231
– a highly plausible conjecture – this does not translate into a constitutional
speech right for the American citizen to speak in Saudi Arabia.  The alternative
would be normatively strange indeed: it would mean that American citizens
who travel abroad are immune from foreign country regulations that do not
comport with American constitutional requirements.  Thus, if speech is a right
simpliciter, it does not apply abroad and a threshold requirement for the
NAACP adjustment accordingly cannot be satisfied.  
On the other hand, the threshold requirement probably is satisfied if
speech is a right-against-rule.  Speech as a right-against-rule would mean the
following: although Saudi Arabia is not subject to American constitutional
limitations and surely can regulate the visiting American citizen as it chooses,232
Congress’ (or a state’s) regulation of its citizen’s extraterritorial conduct233 is
subject to constitutional limitations.  Even if the precise contours of the
constitutional rights vary as between domestic and foreign speech,234 such a
regulatory structure would be consistent with a right-against-rule regime rather
than a right simpliciter regime: the constitutional right does not guarantee a
particular state in the world, but instead places limits on how American polities
can regulate.235  There is no reason to think that a rule that foreign judgments
are to be enforced categorically would fall outside the purview of a right-
against-rules.  Nevertheless, although the threshold requirement thus would be
satisfied, an enforcement rule ultimately would not satisfy the NAACP
exception because, as discussed above, it would not risk the wholesale
evisceration of speech rights.
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236See supra Part III.
237See supra Part II.B.2.
238Evidentiary rules have not been subject to free speech limitations under current law.  See Frederick
Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 696-96 (1997); Christopher J. Peters,
Free Speech and Evidentiary Rules, (draft on file with author).
B.     Normative Considerations.  Having just shown that “enforce foreign
judgments” would not trigger constitutional scrutiny under either the Cloud
Books formulation or the adjusted formulation, the question remains whether
such an outcome is normatively desirable.   
I believe it is.  Deciding otherwise – i.e., embracing IEE –  would erase
the public/private distinction in the same way that Shelley v. Kraemer’s attribution
rationale did.236  Shelley’s reasoning was problematic insofar as it led to the
conclusion that private contractual agreements should be subject to
constitutional constraints if one party sought to enforce her contractual right
in a court of law.  There were two essential parts to the Shelley’s rationale, only
one of which was problematic: the untroubling conclusion that judicial
enforcement of the contract constituted state action and the difficult holding
that the content of the contractual right was to be attributed to the state for
purposes of the state action doctrine.  IEE – applying constitutional scrutiny
if judicial enforcement creates effects on speech –  disregards the source of the
legal right and reproduces the overconstitutionalization that Shelley allowed but
that the post-Shelley case law rejected.  A state statute restricting newspaper
solicitations, sign posting, or public criticism of a type of psychological therapy
would pose serious First Amendment questions, yet recent court decisions have
enforced  these identical  restrictions without constitutional review when they
were created contractually  because the courts have determined there was no
state action.237   IEE would risk re-constitutionalizing the enforcement of these
contracts insofar as enforcing any and all of them clearly has “effects” on
speech.  
Indeed, IEE either opens the floodgates of constitutional review or
demands unprincipled line-drawing to keep the gates in check.  If constitutional
scrutiny is triggered due to the speech-effects of enforcing foreign judgments,
then it would follow that a wide array of matters that do not currently draw
constitutional scrutiny ought to.  For example, constitutional review also would
be appropriate when there are  enforcing domestic judgments has effects on
speech.  Similarly, constitutional review would be necessary in respect of the
judicial or administrative enforcement of domestically sourced legal rights that
have speech-effects.  The rationale of IEE also would suggest that procedural
rules that do not directly regulate conduct but that  have effects on speech,
such as evidentiary rules,238 ought to be subject to constitutional review. 
One who wished to narrow the scope of IEE to avoid such expansive
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239‘See Baker v. General Motors.
240See supra Part III.B.3.
241See supra Parts III.B.1-2.
242But see supra note 216 (noting such a rule’s indeterminacy).
constitutional review might suggest that constitutional review is limited to the
enforcement of judgments, or perhaps to foreign claims, but any such line-drawing
would be difficult to justify on principled grounds. To be stricter with
judgments than legal claims is precisely the converse of ordinary American
doctrines, under which courts have a nearly ironclad obligation to enforce
foreign judgments but significant leeway to decline to apply foreign law.239  Nor
is it easy to explain on principled grounds why the source of the legal right –
foreign or domestic – should be the dividing line between when enforcement
does and does not trigger constitutional review.  If anything, insofar as
American constitutional constraints paradigmatically are limitations on American
governments and sculptors of the American political culture, it would seem that
constitutional scrutiny is more readily justified for legal rights whose source is
domestic rather than foreign.
In short, a doctrine that conditions constitutional scrutiny on the
effects  of enforcement is the analog in the doctrine of incidental burdens to
Shelley’s attribution of the substance of the contractual right to the government
in the state action context.      The two approaches are dissimilar only to the
extent constitutional scrutiny is reserved for “substantial” or “significant”
effects.  The narrower is the scope of “substantial,” the more the public
/private distinction is preserved. As shown above, case law in the state action
context has rejected Shelley’s approach of attributing the content of enforced
contractual rights to the government.240  Part III showed that although there is
nothing illogical with Shelley’s approach, the post-Shelley case law suggests that
attributing to the State the substance of a contract’s rights does not comport
with American cultural sensibilities.241  Attribution defeats the public/private
distinction, and maintaining this dichotomy seems to be important to American
political culture.  To the extent the normative argument for preserving the
public/private dichotomy is sound in the state action context, it would be
unwise to trigger constitutional review because enforcement has effects on
speech.   This suggests that only narrow scope should be given to any
substantial effects exception in the incidental burdens context.  The NAACP-
inspired adjustment to the Cloud Books formulation accordingly is a promising
approach, as a normative matter. By constitutionalizing only those effects  that
threaten absolute deprivation of the underlying constitutional right, it is a
relatively bright line rule242 that preserves the public/private distinction without
unacceptably imperiling constitutional rights.  Applied to enforcement
determinations, it leads to a rejection of the IEE approach, except for those
circumstances where enforcement would risks wholly undermining a
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243See John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988) (noting and criticizing this).
244PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 64-70 (2002);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)(“the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.  He makes treaties with the advice and consent
of the Senate; but he alone negotiates”). 
245See Ackerman & Golove, Is NAFTA Unconstitutional?, supra note 3, at xx.
246American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003).
constitutional right in accordance with the NAACP adjustment to the Cloud
Books formulation. 
V.     THE PROBLEMATICS OF OVER-CONSTITUTIONALIZING
The upshot of the analysis in Part III and IV is this: the Constitution
does not determine whether American courts should enforce Un-American
Judgments.  Court decisions to the contrary are properly described as instances
of erroneous over-constitutionalization.  This Part V shows that these courts’
mistakes are not merely technical in nature, but that they impose several real
world costs. 
A.     Concealing the Need to Decide.   To conclude that the enforcement
of Un-American Judgments is not unconstitutional does not mean that such
judgments should be categorically enforced.  What it does mean is that whether
such foreign judgments should be enforced  is not constitutionally
predetermined, but is something that must be decided as a matter of policy.
Obscuring the need to decide with illusions of false constitutional necessity is
the first pernicious effect of over-constitutionalization.
B.     Institutional Considerations: Who Should Decide?.   Although there are
strong reasons to conclude that governmental officials outside the judiciary are
responsible for participating in interpreting the Constitution, the non-judicial
branches typically defer to judicial interpretations of the Constitution.243  The
practical effect of constitutionalizing the enforcement of Un-American
Judgments accordingly is to make such decisions matters of judicial
determination.   De-constitutionalizing the question makes clear the role that
the other branches properly should play in formulating an enforcement policy.
At the very least, it is clear that the other branches of the federal
government have power under the Constitution to regulate the enforcement
of foreign judgments.  The President has express constitutional authority to
negotiate a treaty concerning the enforcement of judgments, to which the
Senate could give its advice and consent.244  Both houses of Congress could act
in concert with executive action, as happened with NAFTA and other recent
international agreements.245  The President could enter into a so-called
“executive agreement” with other countries, which would “requir[e] no
ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress,”2 4 6 establishing an
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247Such executive action may be upheld even in the absence of federal legislation concerning foreign
judgments insofar as it were an exercise of the President’s foreign affairs powers.  See generally Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).  On the other hand, outside the context of a crisis, such executive
action might be deemed to trench on Congress’ powers.  See TRIMBLE, supra note 243, at 138-140.
248Congress’ power to do this would rest on the Constitution’s grant of the power to make any law
“necessary and proper” to “carry into execution” the foreign relations power and the commerce clause
power.  See id. at 79-80.  Even under the contemporary quasi-Tenth Amendment doctrine of anti-
commandeering, which significantly limits the federal government’s powers to regulate the States, such
federal law emanating from either the executive or legislative branches would bind states courts.  The
Tenth Amendment’s prohibition against the federal government’s commandeering state government has
been held to apply to the state executive and legislative branches, but not to the state judiciary.  See Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928, 935 (1997); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2247-49 (1998) (making this point).
249With the exception of the enforcement statutes discussed supra in Part I.A.
250Of course, even if the executive or legislative branches were to act, it is likely  that courts still would play
an important role in implementing the legislative or executive enactments.  Although well-drafted
legislation can narrow the political judgments that courts would be required to make, courts in all
likelihood still would be responsible for applying the operative rules or principles identified by the
executive or legislative in concrete cases.   ( This is not necessarily the case, of course.  It is possible, for
instance, that the adjudication of foreign judgments could be statutorily directed to specialized
administrative tribunals). 
251See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
enforcement policy.  Though not entirely free from doubt, the President  may
have the power to issue an executive order  enumerating the considerations
that should inform the determination of whether foreign judgments should be
enforced even without specific congressional authorization.247 Congress could
enact legislation that specifies the criteria that courts should consider in
deciding whether to enforce such foreign judgments.248 In fact, it is only in the
absence of action by either the federal executive or legislative branches that
determinations of whether foreign judgments are to be enforced fall – as they
have until now for the most part249 –  to the judicial branch.250  
Pure doctrinal analysis does not fully capture over-
constitutionalization’s costs of  of channeling enforcement determinations to
the judiciary.  A consideration of the criteria relevant to determining whether
Un-American Judgments should be enforced suggests that the more political
branches of government are better suited to laying down a general policy as
regards the enforcement of Un-American Judgments.  There are two plausible
sets of criteria. The first contains the sui generis political considerations that
relate to the United States’ bilateral relations with a particular country.  To
provide an analogy, as part of the effort to conclude the Iranian hostage crisis,
the United States agreed to suspend American claims against Iran that were
pending in American courts without suspending claims that were pending
against all other governments.251  Under widely held notions of democracy and
the allocation of powers effectuated by our Constitution, such ad hoc,
politically-based determinations are best made by the President, or perhaps
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252See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (noting that foreign relations issues that “turn on standards
that defy judicial application,” “ involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the
executive or legislature,” and that “uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views”
properly fall to the executive and legislative branches, not to courts).
253See Rosen, Un-American Foreign Judgments, supra note 2, at xx.
254See id.
255The dissenting Maryland justice noted that these facts were irrelevant to the majority’s analysis.  See
Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at  256 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
Congress, but most definitely not by courts.252  
The second set of criteria contains the considerations that inform a
principled approach to govern the enforcement of foreign judgments generally.
There are good reasons to think that the more political branches – the federal
executive and legislature – also are best situated to making these determinations
in respect to Un-American Judgments. As explained in a companion piece,253
careful thought suggests that there are five distinct sets of interests that are
implicated in enforcement determinations: each of the parties, the country that
issued the judgment, the country that is being asked to enforce the judgment,
and the international system.  Deciding which of these interests are deemed
legally relevant for purposes of deciding whether to enforce the foreign
judgment, and determining  what is to be done when the relevant interests
point in different directions as regards enforcement such that tradeoffs must
be made, involves recourse to extra-legal, value-laden principles that are best
characterized as political in nature.  As that piece shows, determining whether
Un-American Judgments are to be enforced is best performed by the more
political branches of government.254
C.     Overlooked Substantive Considerations: The Pattern of Wholly America-
Centric Analysis. In all three cases discussed above in Part II where American
courts refused to enforce Un-American Judgments, invocation of the “big gun”
of the First Amendment led the courts to undertake a wholly United States-
centric analysis.  Absent from the legal analysis was any serious consideration
of the nature of the foreign country’s or foreign plaintiff’s interests, or the
possible effect that non-enforcement might have on  international law.  The
courts thus ignored  factors that would appear to be relevant to determining
fair outcomes. 
Consider first the Matesuvitch case.  It was legally irrelevant to the court’s
analysis that both parties had been  residents of England at the time
Matusevitch wrote and published his letter, that the letter appeared only in an
English newspaper, and that the subject of their dispute (the BBC’s hiring
policies) had little palpable connection to the United States and can best be
described as a matter of virtually sole interest to England (and, perhaps, the
then Soviet Union).255 While public figures have little protection from
defamation in the American press under American law, England has elected a
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256See Anglicizing Defamation, supra note ?, at 933.
257See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S. 2d at 661-65.
258See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 (“France clearly has the right to enact and enforce such laws as
those relied upon by the French Court here.”).  
259Id.
260See infra note ? and accompanying text.
libel regime under which the honor of public figures is protected no less than
that of private citizens.256  What precisely were the American interests at stake
that justified overriding these countervailing British interests?  The court did
not provide an answer, presumably because it believed that the First
Amendment trumped any such inquiry.  If the First Amendment was not
applicable, then there is no reason to conclusively presume that these
considerations are irrelevant. 
A similar pattern can be seen in the Bachchan decision: The court gave
absolutely no consideration to the interests of England and the non-American
plaintiff  in having the judgment enforced.257  India Abroad was not sued for
what it published in its United States newspaper, but for its English publication
and for the Indian newspaper story that was based on information that India
Abroad had wired to India.  Both India and England have defamation law that
is more pro-plaintiff than that of the United States.  Which substantive law
should apply when false information is published outside of the United States
about a non-American?  How important are Mr. Bachchan’s interest and
England’s interest in the matter?   How does the fact that India Abroad
voluntarily elected to do business in England, and to wire information outside
of the United States, affect the determination of the enforcement question?
The court addressed none of these factors, however, presumably because it
believed that the First Amendment categorically precluded enforcement.
Similar United States-centric analysis is found in the district court’s
decision in the  Yahoo! case.  To its credit, the district court opinion did not
wholly entirely ignore France’s interest.2 5 8  In its haste to advance to its First
Amendment analysis, however, the court erected a straw man.  The court
concluded that France did not have an interest in the enforcement decision
because refusing to  enforce the foreign judgment did not affect the “the right
of France or any other nation to determine its own law and social policies.”259
This is true but beside the point.  If Country B allows people within its territory
to aid and abet persons in Country A from breaking Country A’s laws, Country
B undercuts Country A’s ability  to make efficacious laws that advance its social
policies.  This was the gravamen of the plaintiff’s claim: that the ready access
to Nazi auction sites that Yahoo! provided undermined France’s ability to
enforce its law and vindicate its chosen social policy.260  It follows that France
had an interest in the U.S. district court’s enforcement decision,
notwithstanding the federal judge’s determination to the contrary.
[2003]                                Exporting the Constitution                                    53
261Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185; see also Post and Johnson.
262See supra note 58.
263See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1191 & n. 10 (“the Court concludes that Yahoo!’s ability to comply with
the order is immaterial to the question of whether enforcement of the order in the United States would
be constitutional.”); id. at 1194 (finding that the French parties “have failed to show the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact or to identify any such issue the existence of which could be shown through
further discovery.”).
264Id.
Overlooking France’s interest led the Yahoo! court to label as legally
irrelevant the most pertinent fact to the enforcement decision.  Yahoo! argued
that the Internet is a borderless medium, such that any action that Yahoo!
might undertake to restrict access to Nazi sites would affect people outside of
France.261   The plaintiffs argued, however, that Yahoo! already had the
technology to identify users’ geographical locations and hence to screen out
only computer users in France.  The High Court in France made a factual
finding that Yahoo! had this capability.262  The U.S.  district court, however,
concluded that this factual question was legally irrelevant.263  Why?  Due to the
First Amendment, of course.264   This is a double mistake.  As shown above, the
First Amendment doesn’t resolve the question.  Good sense suggests, and in
a companion piece I will show, that whether Yahoo!’s compliance with French
law would result in censorship of Nazi auction sites in the countries in the
world where such sites are not prohibited is  legally relevant to determining
whether France should be able to keep Yahoo! from acting in ways that
undermine the efficacy of French law.  
CONCLUSION
Laws created by foreign governments that could not have been enacted
by governments in the United States due to the Constitution surely are “Un-
American.”  Not only do they emerge from non-American polities, but they
incorporate values that diverge from core American constitutional
commitments.  Such foreign laws are not, however, unconstitutional, for they
are not  products of the United States political community.  Nor is it
unconstitutional for an American court to enforce a foreign judgment based on
such a law.  The substance of the laws are not properly attributed to the United
States under contemporary state action doctrine, and wisely so.  Likewise, the
effects of enforcing foreign judgments should not trigger constitutional scrutiny
under the doctrine of incidental burdens.  The recent courts that have
concluded that enforcing Un-American judgments itself would be
unconstitutional have misanalyzed the issue.  In so doing, they have utilized a
wholly United States-centered analysis that omits many considerations that are
crucial to arriving at just outcomes.  
The categorical refusal to enforce such judgments harms plaintiffs that
have prevailed abroad, undermines the ability of foreign countries to advance
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political commitments that diverge from American constitutional values, and
creates needless costs and uncertainty for the international community. The
illusion that the Constitution answers the enforceability question obscures the
value-laden political judgments that inevitably inform the determination of
whether Un-American Judgments should be enforced.  Disguising such
political judgments in the garb of constitutional necessity channels enforcement
determinations from the more political branches to the courts and erroneously
narrows the scope of the President’s and Congress’s powers in respect to
foreign affairs. This is particularly unfortunate.  There are good reasons to
think that foreign relations generally, including the deeply political
considerations that are involved in formulating a policy as regards enforcement,
is a domain best suited to the more political branches. 1
